The Case Against Income Tax Exemption for Nonprofits by Michael Fricke
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 89 
Number 4 Volume 89, Winter 2015, Number 4 Article 3 
October 2016 
The Case Against Income Tax Exemption for Nonprofits 
Michael Fricke 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Tax Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michael Fricke (2015) "The Case Against Income Tax Exemption for Nonprofits," St. John's Law Review: 
Vol. 89 : No. 4 , Article 3. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol89/iss4/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
FINAL_FRICKE 6/28/2016 2:36 PM 
 
1129 
THE CASE AGAINST INCOME TAX 
EXEMPTION FOR NONPROFITS 
MICHAEL FRICKE† 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................ 1130?
I.? BACKGROUND ........................................................................ 1134?
A.? How the Tax Code Treats Nonprofit  
Organizations ............................................................. 1134?
B.? Historical Development of the Income Tax 
Exemption ................................................................... 1138?
C.? Theories Justifying Income Tax Exemption for 
Nonprofits ................................................................... 1140?
1.? The Public Good Theory........................................ 1140?
2.? The Income Measurement Theory ....................... 1142?
3.? The Capital Formation Theory ............................. 1145?
4.? The Donative Theory ............................................ 1147?
5.? Other Theories ...................................................... 1151?
6.? Conclusions from Current Theories of Income 
Tax Exemption ...................................................... 1152?
II. ?THE PROBLEM ...................................................................... 1153?
Table 1: Ten Largest Educational Nonprofits by Total 
Assets .......................................................................... 1155?
Table 2: Ten Largest Health Care Nonprofits by Total 
Assets .......................................................................... 1155?
Table 3: Ten Largest Arts Nonprofits by Total Assets ... 1156?
III.? ? OTHER PROPOSED REFORMS .............................................. 1162?
A.? Mandatory Distributions for University 
Endowments ............................................................... 1162?
B.? The Addition of a “Nondiversion” Constraint for 
Nonprofits ................................................................... 1163?
C.? Elimination of Barriers Between Nonprofit and 
For-Profit Enterprises ................................................ 1164 
?
?
† Lecturer of Business Administration, University of Illinois College of Business. 
Special thanks to Paul Lansing for his helpful insight during the writing of this 
Article. 
FINAL_FRICKE 6/28/2016  2:36 PM 
1130 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:1129   
IV.? ? THE PROPOSED SOLUTION ................................................. 1166?
A.? A Framework for Evaluating Any Proposed Change 
to the Tax Code ........................................................... 1166?
B.? A Proposal for Reforming Nonprofit Income 
Taxation ...................................................................... 1167?
C.? Evaluating the Proposal Against the Framework .... 1170?
D.? So What Value Remains in Nonprofit Status? ......... 1172?
E.? Convergence with Other Theories of Exemption ...... 1174?
F.? What of the UBIT? ..................................................... 1176?
V.? CHALLENGES TO THE PROPOSED SOLUTION ........................ 1176?
A.? Is the Proposal Even Possible, Given the 
Entrenched Nature of the Income Tax Exemption 
for Nonprofits? ............................................................ 1177?
B.? Would the Proposal Encourage Wasteful Spending 
To Avoid Taxation? ..................................................... 1180?
C.? Other Objections......................................................... 1182?
CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 1183?
 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that “the big one” finally strikes Southern 
California—a major earthquake destroys buildings and leaves 
thousands homeless and without power, water, and other basic 
necessities.  Immediately, Hollywood springs into action and 
marshals every A-list entertainer available to perform for a 
concert benefiting earthquake relief.  As George Clooney, Kanye 
West, and Taylor Swift plead with television viewers to help the 
people of Los Angeles, they reassure the public that one-hundred 
percent of all their donations will go directly to the American Red 
Cross for relief of those affected by the disaster.  Swayed by this 
guarantee, the American people step up and provide millions of 
dollars to help their west coast neighbors recover. 
Now, consider what might have happened had the celebrities 
instead informed the viewers that the Red Cross already had 
plenty of money in its coffers to handle the crisis, but that it 
would appreciate more donations so the Red Cross would not 
have to dip into its savings.  Not quite as compelling of a 
marketing pitch, is it? 
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As a society, we have come to expect certain things.  
Politicians will say anything to get your vote; the Chicago Cubs 
will always be a group of lovable losers; and when we donate 
money to a nonprofit1 organization, that money will, in some 
way, aid in making our society better.  But with regard to the 
latter, what we do not expect is for the nonprofit organization to 
accept our donation and then fail to use it to further its 
charitable purposes,2 or worse, to never use the money for 
anything at all. 
Yet, as the nonprofit segment of the marketplace continues 
to grow,3 a nonprofit’s failure to use donations for charitable 
purposes occurs more and more frequently.  Most of us have an 
ingrained image of nonprofit organizations as perpetually 
scraping the bottom of the barrel for pennies to cover its 
operating expenses, while its staff happily lives below the poverty 
level because they believe in “the cause.”  Then we write that 
year-end check to take advantage of tax deductions and imagine 
balloons falling from the sky at whatever ramshackle hut that 
passes for the organization’s headquarters.  Our generosity has 
enabled the organization to fight the good fight for yet another 
day! 
Romanticism aside, many exempt organizations defy these 
traditional notions of the nonprofit world.  While the food pantry 
in town probably does use every spare penny to feed the 
homeless, there are quite a few organizations that would happily  
 
 
?
1 The terms “nonprofit,” “not-for-profit,” and “non-profit” are each bandied about 
with varying degrees of frequency in both academic and popular literature and are 
synonymous. This Article uses “nonprofit” to encompass all three. 
2 The Internal Revenue Code exempts organizations from taxation for a number 
of reasons beyond just charitable purposes—for example, educational and scientific. 
See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (West 2014). For the purposes of this Article, the term 
“charitable purposes” is used to encompass all valid exempt purposes. 
3 In 2009, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) received 320,791 Form 990 or 
990-EZ returns, which are required of all mid- to large-sized nonprofit organizations, 
which have combined total assets of almost $2.7 trillion. Paul Arnsberger, Nonprofit 
Charitable Organizations, 2009, STAT. INCOME BULL., 2012, at 169, available at 
http://www.irs.gov/PUP/taxstats/productsandpubs/12eofallbulteorg.pdf [hereinafter 
Arnsberger, 2009 Nonprofit Charitable Organizations]. Contrast this with a decade 
prior when the IRS received 211,615 Forms 990 from nonprofits in 1999, with 
aggregate assets holdings of $1.45 trillion. Paul Arnsberger, Nonprofit Charitable 
Organizations, 2005, STAT. INCOME BULL., 2008, at 270, available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/99eochar.pdf. 
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accept your donation, but to be perfectly honest, are doing just 
fine without it.  If you donated to one of these nonprofits, there is 
a pretty good chance your money would be added to the pot,4 
where it would sit indefinitely, unused, but earning interest. 
Who cares, you say?  As long as an organization is engaged 
in benevolently helping society, then why should we concern 
ourselves with inquiries into its strategy choices?  After all, for-
profit companies stockpile cash all the time for various purposes5 
and their shareholders, to whom that cash belongs, are perfectly 
fine with it.  Why should we not trust the management of a 
nonprofit organization in the same way? 
That question can be answered in two parts.  The first goes 
back to our expectations as a society.  We have the expectation 
that nonprofit organizations will use the funds given to them for 
their tax-exempt purposes in a timely manner.  A common 
framework for understanding donations to nonprofits is to 
imagine the donor as purchasing services to be provided by the 
nonprofit to some third-party beneficiary.6  If we purchase some 
services by donating money, should we not expect those services 
to actually be performed reasonably promptly? 
The second part of the answer involves the nature of what it 
means to be tax exempt.  In economic terms, a tax exemption is 
equivalent to a government subsidy.7  When an individual 
donates to charity, that individual is only donating a part of the 
money given.8  The Internal Revenue Code allows the individual 
to deduct the amount donated from his or her taxable income.9  
While a nonprofit organization enjoys the benefits of receiving  
 
 
 
?
4 The nonprofit industry calls this an endowment, which is essentially the 
equivalent of the investments section of a for-profit company’s balance sheet. 
5 Perhaps the most common reason a for-profit firm would seek to stockpile cash 
is for planning a significant capital project in the near future, which is also a 
common reason for nonprofits to beef up their endowments, an issue considered in 
Part V, infra. 
6 See, e.g., Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of the Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE 
L.J. 835, 860 (1980) (showing that donations made to colleges and universities are a 
way for alumni to help finance the education of current and future students). 
7 Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from 
the Corporate Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54, 66–67 (1981). 
8 Id. at 71–72. 
9 Id. 
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unlimited amounts of tax-free income, the government is still 
subsidizing the operations of that nonprofit in the amount that 
the organization would have paid in taxes, had it been a for-profit 
company.10 
Thus, society and government both have a vested interest in 
ensuring that nonprofit entities abide by our expectations.  
Unfortunately, some do not, and the problem of nonprofits 
hoarding cash seems to be getting worse.11 
This tendency toward hoarding cash by some of the nation’s 
largest nonprofits signals the need to rethink the way we treat 
nonprofits from a tax perspective.  It is undisputed that society 
desires nongovernmental organizations that work to alleviate 
poverty, educate people, and advance human knowledge.  If the 
government—and by extension, individual taxpayers—is 
subsidizing these organizations, should we not think critically 
about the best methods and policies for achieving our desired 
results? 
To this end, it seems that the time has come to end income 
tax exemption for nonprofit organizations.  The arguments for 
exempting nonprofits are—and have always been—shaky, at 
best,12 and there are better methods for achieving our societal 
goals.  Expanding the definition of a business expense and 
eliminating the income tax exemption for nonprofits would 
incentivize charitable organizations to use their funds currently 
instead of propping up their endowments at the expense of their 
programs. 
In order to discuss the current state of affairs in the 
nonprofit world, Part I of this Article addresses how nonprofits 
are treated under the law and the various income tax exemption 
defenses that have been proffered over the years.  Then, Part II 
investigates the problems raised by organizations that take  
 
?
10 Id. at 66–67. 
11 The outcry has been especially strong against colleges that diligently build up 
their endowments at the same time that they increase costs, therefore increasing 
student debt. See, e.g., Goldie Blumenstyk, Pressure Builds on Wealthy Colleges To 
Spend More of Their Assets, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 26, 2007, available at 
http://chronicle.com/daily/2007/10/508n.htm; Charles E. Grassley, Wealthy Colleges 
Must Make Themselves More Affordable, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 30, 2008, 
available at http://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/wealthy-colleges-
must-make-themselves-more-affordable. 
12 See infra Part I.C. 
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advantage of their tax exemption, but decline to use their 
revenue for their exempt purposes.  This problem has been 
addressed infrequently in academic literature, but Part III 
reviews other proposed reforms that might affect this issue.  Part 
IV lays out the proposed solution, and Part V examines the 
challenges and potential objections to these reforms. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The taxation of nonprofit organizations currently seems to be 
in a place of relative stasis, although changing economic and 
social factors can upend a seemingly stable paradigm very 
quickly.  This Part starts by discussing how nonprofits are 
currently treated by the Internal Revenue Code (“tax code”).  
Then, it delves into some of the history of the exemption in an 
attempt to glean Congress’s intent in enacting it.  Finally, this 
Part concludes by considering some of the many scholarly 
justifications given for exempting nonprofits from income 
taxation and why they all seem somewhat unsatisfactory. 
A. How the Tax Code Treats Nonprofit Organizations 
Section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code13 is quite possibly 
the single most well-known statute in the United States.  In 
subsections (c) and (d) of § 501, Congress sets forth a lengthy list 
of organizations that may receive an exemption from the 
requirement to pay tax on their income.14  While there are dozens 
of purposes for which an organization may be organized and 
receive an income tax exemption, much of the action in § 501 
happens in paragraph (c)(3), which exempts organizations 
“operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing 
for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster 
national or international amateur sports competition . . . or for 
the prevention of cruelty to children or animals.”15  The reason 
that these types of nonprofits—often called “501(c)(3) 
organizations”—receive so much attention is because money 
donated to them is generally deductible from the donor’s taxable 
income under § 170 of the tax code.16  Thus, much of the revenue 
?
13 I.R.C. § 501 (West 2014). 
14 Id. § 501(c)–(d). 
15 Id. § 501(c). 
16 Id. § 170. 
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flowing into such organizations escapes taxation at two levels: 
once for the donor and once for the recipient.  The vast majority 
of non-501(c)(3) nonprofits might still enjoy exemption from 
income tax, but their donors do not receive any special tax 
benefits for making a donation.17  For this reason, almost all 
organizations whose purposes are even close to the purposes 
outlined in § 501(c)(3) will fight tooth-and-nail to be classified 
under § 501(c)(3). 
The tax code imposes several more restrictions on 
organizations hoping to receive the benefits of § 501(c)(3), the 
most important of which is that any profits made by the 
organization18 must not “inure[] to the benefit of any private 
shareholder or individual.”19  Professor Hansmann coined the 
term “nondistribution constraint” to describe this requirement 
because it prohibits a nonprofit from distributing its profits in 
the same manner as a for-profit corporation.20  Along with the 
organization’s purpose, the nondistribution constraint is the key 
characteristic that defines a nonprofit.21 
Thus, any organization that is formed for a valid exempt 
purpose under § 501(c)(3) and agrees not to distribute any of its 
profits to any private person is eligible to be exempt from federal 
income tax, and donors to such organizations may deduct their 
donations from their taxable income.  These two very powerful 
characteristics have driven strong growth in the nonprofit sector 
?
17 This is not to say that the exemption itself is not a significant and desirable 
benefit, even for those nonprofits that do not qualify to receive deductible donations. 
Indeed, this Article’s analysis generally applies equally to all entities currently 
exempt from federal income taxation, regardless of whether they can receive 
deductible donations under § 170. 
18 In a sense, the term “nonprofit” is a bit of a misnomer. Nonprofits are not 
barred from earning a profit; they are simply limited as to how they may use their 
profits. In recent years, the term “not-for-profit” has been introduced to imply that 
the organization is not operated for the purpose of generating a profit, but rather to 
fulfill its charitable purpose. “Nonprofit” still seems to be the most widely used term, 
however, and there is an argument to be made, albeit well outside the scope of this 
Article, that “not-for-profit” has its own faults, considering the behavior of many tax 
exempt organizations. 
19 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 
20 Hansmann, supra note 6, at 838. 
21 See id. Section 501(c)(3) also imposes the requirements that the organization 
must not, as a significant part of its operation, carry on propaganda, attempt to 
influence legislation, or campaign directly for or against any political candidate. 
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). However, for the purposes of this Article, these additional 
constraints are less relevant than the nondistribution constraint. 
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in recent years.  Between 1998 and 2010, the total number of 
501(c)(3) nonprofits registered with the Interal Revenue Service 
(“IRS”) grew from 733,790 to 1,280,739, a whopping increase of 
74.5%.22  Excluding churches, public charities received nearly 
$1.5 trillion in revenue in 2009 and held $2.7 trillion in total 
assets,23 meaning the nonprofit sector accounted for more than 
ten percent of the U.S. gross domestic product (“GDP”) in 2009. 
Another important provision of the tax code applies to 
nonprofits that generate profits from activities outside their 
stated exempt purpose.  The tax code imposes an income tax on 
these profits called the unrelated business income tax24 (“UBIT”).  
The UBIT can be complicated, as the difference between revenue 
generated from an organization’s exempt purposes and revenue 
generated from unrelated activities is seldom a bright-line 
difference.25 
The tax code provides that the UBIT will be charged on 
income derived from the following: 
[A]ny trade or business the conduct of which is not substantially 
related (aside from the need of such organization for income or 
funds or the use it makes of the profits derived) to the exercise 
or performance by such organization of its charitable, 
educational, or other purpose or function constituting the basis 
for its exemption under section 501.26 
From this definition alone, a host of questions arises regarding 
exactly what types of revenues are subject to the UBIT.27 
 
 
?
22 Table 25. Tax-Exempt Organizations and Other Entities, Fiscal Years  
1991–2010 (Expanded) [1], INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., http://www.irs.gov/ 
file_source/pub/irs-soi/10db25eoe.xls (last visited Feb. 28, 2016). 
23 Arnsberger, 2009 Nonprofit Charitable Organizations, supra note 3, at 172, 
174. 
24 I.R.C. §§ 511–13. 
25 Jessica Peña & Alexander L.T. Reid, A Call for Reform of the Operational Test 
for Unrelated Commercial Activity in Charities, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1855, 1858 (2001). 
26 I.R.C. § 513(a) (2012). 
27 The line between what is “substantially related” to a nonprofit’s charitable 
purpose and what is not is rather hazy. Does the selling of cookies have anything to 
do with teaching young Girl Scouts about leadership and responsibility? Perhaps; 
but if a museum sold cookies in its cafeteria, the connection to its charitable purpose 
would be far more tenuous—same activity, different results depending on the 
nonprofit. 
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While the specifics of the application of the UBIT are 
complicated, for this Article’s purposes, its importance derives 
from the fact that Congress enacted the UBIT to combat a 
specific problem that had arisen in the nonprofit sector.  The 
legislative history of the UBIT states, “The problem at which the 
tax on unrelated business income is directed is primarily that of 
unfair competition.  The tax-free status of [exempt] organizations 
enables them to use their profits tax-free to expand operations, 
while their competitors can expand only with the profits 
remaining after taxes.”28  Essentially, the UBIT was enacted as a 
means to protect the for-profit sector from the unchecked growth 
of competition from the nonprofit sector.29 
One final provision of the tax code worth mentioning at this 
point is § 162, which pertains to deductions for business 
expenses.30  Since nonprofits are exempt from income taxation, 
§ 162 does not currently apply to nonprofits, but it will become 
important later in our discussion31 so it merits some brief 
attention at this point.  In general, businesses that are not 
exempt from income taxation are permitted to deduct from their 
taxable income “all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or 
incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or 
business.”32  Donations by a business to a charitable organization 
are deductible from the business’s taxable income, but not as a 
business expense under § 162;33 such donations are deductible 
under § 170.34  As a general rule, activities engaged in by a  
for-profit firm are only deductible if such activities contribute to 
the profit-seeking goals of the firm.35  Thus, while a nonprofit 
generally may receive unlimited revenue tax-free as long as it is 
obtained in the pursuit of the organization’s charitable 
purposes,36 a for-profit firm can likewise deduct an unlimited 
amount of expenses from its taxable income as long as such 
?
28 S. REP. No. 81-2375, at 28 (1950), reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3053, 3081. 
29 John M. Strefeler & Leslie T. Miller, Exempt Organizations: A Study of Their 
Nature and the Applicability of the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 12 AKRON TAX J. 
223, 247 (1996). 
30 I.R.C. § 162 (West 2014). 
31 See infra Part IV.C. 
32 I.R.C. § 162(a). 
33 Id. § 162(b). 
34 Id. § 170(a)(1). 
35 Id. § 183(a). 
36 Id. § 501(a). 
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expenses were paid in the pursuit of the organization’s  
profit-making purposes.37  Note, however, that a for-profit firm 
may only deduct a maximum of ten percent of its taxable income 
for donations made to charitable organizations.38  This concept is 
discussed further when broadening the § 162 deduction is 
discussed in Part V, below.39 
B. Historical Development of the Income Tax Exemption 
From the very beginning of broad taxation in the United 
States, charitable organizations have been exempt.  The Tariff 
Act of 1894 provided that “nothing herein contained shall apply 
to . . . corporations, companies, or associations organized and 
conducted solely for charitable, religious, or educational 
purposes.”40  The condition that such charitable organizations not 
distribute their profits to any private person was added in the 
Payne Aldrich Tariff Act of 190941 and in the Corporation Excise 
Tax Act of 1909.42  Four years later, the Revenue Act of 1913 
added scientific purposes as a valid reason for exemption,43 and 
various other expansions and limitations took place over the next 
several decades.44  The passing of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, 
which created the distinction between private foundations and 
public charities and imposed several forms of tax on private 
?
37 Id. § 162(a). 
38 Id. § 170(b)(2)(A). 
39 See infra Part V. 
40 Tariff Act of 1894, ch. 349, 28 Stat. 509, 556, invalidated by Pollock v. 
Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 583 (1895). 
41 Payne Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909, ch. 6, 36 Stat. 11, 113 (“[A]ny corporation or 
association organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, or 
educational purposes, no part of the net income of which inures to the benefit of any 
private stockholder or individual.”). 
42 Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909, ch. 6, 36 Stat. 11, 112–13 (current 
version at 26 U.S.C. subchapter C). 
43 Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 172, amended by Revenue Act of 
1916, ch. 463, 39 Stat. 756, 766, 801 (1916). 
44 See, e.g., Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 736, 68 Stat. 3, 163 (restricting 
charitable organizations from participating in political activities); Revenue Act of 
1934, ch. 277, 48 Stat. 680, 700 (restricting charitable organizations from certain 
lobbying efforts); Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, 42 Stat. 227, 253 (including 
community chests, funds, or foundations and literary purposes as exempt purposes); 
Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1057, 1076 (1919), amended by Revenue Act of 
1921, ch. 136, 42 Stat. 227, 253 (including prevention of cruelty to children or 
animals as exempt purposes). 
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foundations,45 was the last time Congress acted in any significant 
way that affects the tax status of nonprofit organizations.  For 
the past forty-six years, the tax code as it pertains to nonprofits 
has been remarkably static. 
Even though the income tax exemption for nonprofits is 
firmly established in the tax code, there is relatively little 
guidance as to Congress’s justification for adopting such 
measures.  The sponsor of the Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909 
noted that the exemption was meant for organizations “devoted 
exclusively to the relief of suffering, to the alleviation of our 
people, and to all things which commend themselves to every 
charitable and just impulse.”46  Similarly, a 1939 House 
Committee Report states that the exemption is meant for those 
organizations that provide “benefits resulting from the promotion 
of the general welfare.”47  While these and similar citations 
provide insight into Congress’s view of the nonprofit sector, there 
are very few sources detailing the theoretical basis for justifying 
the exemption.  Indeed, it seems, for the most part, like Congress 
simply took for granted the fact that charitable organizations 
should be exempt from taxation, as can be inferred from the 
following quote from Cordell Hull, author of the Revenue Act of 
1913: 
Of course any kind of society or corporation that is not doing 
business for profit and not acquiring profit would not come 
within the meaning of the taxing clause . . . . So I see no 
occasion whatever for undertaking to particularize . . . . I think 
the better way is to follow the exemption clause that has been 
well defined and understood heretofore without any particular 
objection.48 
?
45 Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91–172, 83 Stat. 487, 496–98. These 
taxes on private foundations are discussed in more detail in Part V.A. 
46 STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-29-05, HISTORICAL 
DEVELOPMENT AND PRESENT LAW OF THE FEDERAL TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES 
AND OTHER TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS SCHEDULED FOR A PUBLIC HEARING 
BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS ON APRIL 20, 2005 66 (2005); 
see also 44 CONG. REC. 4147, 4150 (1909). 
47 H.R. REP. NO. 75-1860, at 19 (1938). 
48 50 CONG. REC. 1266, 1306 (1913). It could be argued that Representative 
Hull’s quote reflects a similar logic as that used by Bittker and Rahdert in their 
article defending the income tax exemption on the basis that the terminology used to 
describe income and expenses by definition does not apply to nonprofits, and thus, 
even if we desired to tax them, there would be no mechanism for determining what 
to tax or how much to tax. See infra Part II.C.2. Representative Hull’s statement 
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Since Congress has provided us with minimal guidance as to its 
justification for exempting nonprofits from income tax, it has 
been left to legal scholars to determine an appropriate theory for 
defending the exemption. 
C. Theories Justifying Income Tax Exemption for Nonprofits 
Beginning in the 1970s and running through today, a line of 
scholarly articles have proffered many theories as to why 
nonprofit organizations should be exempt from income taxation.49  
One would imagine that, with so many attempts at a satisfactory 
theory over the last forty years, matters would be settled; but, on 
the contrary, each theory seems to leave the reader unsatisfied.  
While each has its own merits, perhaps the very fact that so 
many legal scholars have felt the need to justify exempting 
nonprofits is itself an indication that such exemption is 
unwarranted in its current form. 
1. The Public Good Theory 
The theory of exemption with which most readers will be 
familiar is called the Public Good Theory (“PGT”).  Indeed, even 
the United States Supreme Court has endorsed the PGT as one 
reason for exempting nonprofit organizations.50  In Walz v. Tax 
Commission of New York,51 Chief Justice Berger’s majority 
opinion stated that private, nonprofit organizations “bear 
burdens that would otherwise either have to be met by general 
taxation, or be left undone, to the detriment of the community.”52 
 
 
?
seems to diverge from Bittker and Rahdert’s line of thinking in that Hull assumes 
that nonprofits are actually not acquiring profits, as compared to the current view 
whereby nonprofits are free to acquire profits but not to use them for the benefit of 
any private person. 
49 See, e.g., Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit 
Organizations from Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299 (1976); Mark A. Hall 
& John D. Colombo, The Charitable Status of Nonprofit Hospitals: Toward a 
Donative Theory of Tax Exemption, 66 WASH. L. REV. 307 (1991); Hansmann, supra 
note 7. 
50 See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591–92 (1983); Walz v. 
Tax Comm’n of N.Y.C., 397 U.S. 664, 687 (1970). 
51 397 U.S. 664. 
52 Id. at 687. 
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Thus, the gist of the PGT is that the government is unable, 
or ill equipped, to fulfill all of the services that society might 
desire.  When a nonprofit steps in and provides these  
services—be they, for example, education, research, or poverty 
relief—the government subsidizes such operations by providing a 
tax exemption.  In the absence of the nonprofit, the government 
itself would be forced to provide the service or society would have 
to go without.  As an incentive for the private sector to fill in the 
gap, the government in essence agrees to split the cost with the 
nonprofit—although Uncle Sam still gets the better end of that 
deal, financially. 
At first glance, the PGT is fairly attractive, especially when 
considering nonprofits that fulfill traditional roles, such as 
poverty relief.  As a general rule, American society provides 
safety nets to prevent those in poverty from living on the streets 
or going hungry.  Welfare programs cost the federal 
government—depending on how you define “welfare”—up to a 
trillion dollars annually;53 so whenever a private organization 
offers to alleviate some of the government’s burden in this area, 
it behooves the government to subsidize that organization.  
Additionally, the PGT provides cover for Congress for exempting 
certain classes of nonprofits and not others.54  Only those 
nonprofits that actually provide a public good should be 
exempted, with all others being taxed.55 
 
 
?
53 Jeff Sessions, CRS Report: Welfare Spending the Largest Item in the Federal 
Budget, (Oct. 18, 2012) http://www.budget.senate.gov/republican/public/index.cfm/ 
files/serve/?File_id=34919307-6286-47ab-b114-2fd5bcedfeb5. The Congressional 
Research Service report cited by Senator Sessions lists approximately eighty federal 
programs, not all of which are always identified as “welfare.” Thus, Senator 
Sessions’s figure of $1.04 trillion is likely on the extreme high end. See Glenn 
Kessler, Does the Federal Government Spend More on ‘Welfare’ than Anything Else?, 
WASH. POST (Feb. 20, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/post/ 
does-the-federal-government-spend-more-on-welfare-than-anything-else/2013/02/19/f 
a0042a2-7b0c-11e2-9a75-dab0201670da_blog.html. 
54 See Hansmann, supra note 7, at 66. When we think of nonprofits, we typically 
associate tax exemption with them, but the two do not always go hand-in-hand. 
Various forms of nonprofit organizations that might not fit into the categories set 
forth in 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) or (d) do not enjoy the full extent of tax benefits that most 
nonprofits do. 
55 Id. 
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However, the PGT is not without flaws.  First, and most 
obvious, if the government is concerned about subsidizing public 
goods, why only make the subsidy available to firms that agree 
not to distribute their profits?56  There seems to be no logical 
reason for why a for-profit firm could not build a park or a 
homeless shelter and receive a tax break from doing so without 
having to funnel the funds first through a nonprofit.  True, it 
could be argued that limiting the exemption to nonprofit firms 
might ensure higher quality services for the end user of the 
public good or serve to reduce fraud, but in a competitive market, 
this problem would likely be minimal.57 
Similarly, a number of enumerated exempt organizations in 
§ 501(c) do not seem to produce what could be classified as a 
public good, again raising the question of the reasoning behind 
the PGT.58  For example, a handful of organizations exempt 
under § 501 serve only their own members and not the public in 
any way, such as fraternal organizations,59 labor organizations,60 
and credit unions.61  What merits an income tax exemption for 
such entities?  Sure, the members of a fraternal organization 
might benefit from its existence, but how does the public at 
large?  And yet, such organizations remain free from income 
taxation under § 501 of the tax code. 
While the Public Good Theory remains popular and is 
attractive at the outset, when applied to the manner in which 
nonprofit organizations actually operate in the context of society, 
its weaknesses become apparent.  While it might apply to some 
nonprofits, the PGT cannot simply be used as a universal theory 
supporting tax exemption. 
2. The Income Measurement Theory 
In 1976, Boris Bittker and George Rahdert took a swipe at 
justifying nonprofit tax exemption by examining the technical 
meaning of the words used by the tax code in reference to income 
?
56 Id. at 67. 
57 Id. Consumers—even consumers of public goods—can recognize low quality 
products and will thus shift demand to firms that produce higher quality goods. 
58 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 501(c)(10) (West 2014) (exempting fraternal beneficiary 
societies, orders, or associations). There is no corresponding requirement that these 
organizations produce any good to be made available to the public. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. § 501(c)(5). 
61 Id. § 501(c)(14). 
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and taxation.62  They began with the dominant exemption theory 
of the day, Public Good Theory, and decided it was unnecessary 
to even worry about defending the exemption on policy grounds 
because “neither the ‘net income’ concept nor the ‘ability to pay’ 
rationale for income taxation can be satisfactorily applied to 
charitable organizations.”63 
In essence, Bittker and Rahdert were arguing that, while 
nonprofits may very well take in more money than they spend, 
the difference is not “net income” in the way that term is used in 
the tax code.64  From the very early days of the Revenue Act of 
1894, Congress imposed a tax on the net income “of 
all . . . corporations, companies, or associations doing business for 
profit . . . .”65  According to Bittker and Rahdert, since nonprofits 
are by definition not doing business for profit, the concept of net 
income, as used in federal tax statutes, cannot be applied to 
them.66  These authors further argue that even if we were to 
attempt to tax a nonprofit’s net income, calculating such a figure 
would simply be too difficult.67  Are charitable donations to be 
included in net income?68  Should the nonprofit be treated merely 
as a conduit whereby donors transfer funds to the ultimate 
recipients of the charity, thereby causing the nonprofit to look 
more like a bank than an operating entity?69  How do you 
determine “ordinary and necessary business expenses” for a firm 
that is not motivated by profit?70  Bittker and Rahdert raise all of 
these questions, and many more, in their effort to show that 
calculating the net income of a nonprofit organization is difficult, 
at best. 
 
 
 
 
?
62 See Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 49, at 301. 
63 Id. at 333. 
64 Id. at 302. 
65 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Revenue Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, 28 
Stat. 556) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
66 Id. at 302–03. 
67 Id. at 307–14. 
68 Id. at 308. 
69 Id. at 309. 
70 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Their solution, then, is to exempt nonprofits, not because of 
the type of service they provide to society, as was the case under 
the Public Good Theory, but because the very nature of a 
nonprofit firm defies the application of the principles of the tax 
code.71 
In critiquing Bittker and Rahdert’s argument, one obvious 
objection can be raised.  While it might be difficult to classify all 
of a nonprofit’s revenues and expenses using the terminology of 
the for-profit world, at the end of the day, the organization will 
bring in and spend a certain amount of money during the course 
of a year.  If the total amount of money it brings in exceeds the 
amount of money it spent, could we not label that as “net income” 
or “profit”?  It certainly seems to be the case that Bittker and 
Rahdert “overstate the difficulties” of determining the net income 
of nonprofit organizations.72 
Indeed, the current tax code provides that “[e]xcept as 
otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross income means all 
income from whatever source derived.”73  However, the code does 
also provide that income from gifts is specifically excluded from 
gross income,74 so perhaps there is a discussion to be had as to 
whether a donation to a nonprofit is a gift or the purchase of 
services to be provided to a third-party beneficiary.  With these 
minor complications aside, it would not be particularly onerous to 
construct a functional definition for the net income of a nonprofit 
if Congress chose to do so. 
Thus, the justification offered by Bittker and Rahdert, while 
unique and fairly clever, nonetheless fails to satisfy our need for 
a comprehensive defense of the tax exemption for nonprofit firms.  
Perhaps Professor Hansmann, writing just a few short years 
after Bittker and Rahdert—published in the very same journal, 
no less—can help in this search.75 
 
?
71 Id. at 302. 
72 Hansmann, supra note 7, at 58–59. 
73 I.R.C. § 61 (2012). 
74 See id. § 102. 
75 See Hansmann, supra note 7, at 54. 
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3. The Capital Formation Theory 
Having examined both the Public Good Theory76 and Bittker 
and Rahdert’s arguments pertaining to the problems surrounding 
the definition of a nonprofit’s income,77 Professor Hansmann 
proceeds to develop his own justification for exempting nonprofits 
grounded in economics.78  According to Hansmann, nonprofits are 
at a disadvantage when it comes to raising funds because they 
are unable to issue stock and raise capital.79  As a result, the only 
means by which a nonprofit may raise capital are “debt, 
donations, and retained earnings.”80  Donations are an 
“uncertain” source of funds, and many nonprofits do not even rely 
on a model whereby they are supported by donations at all.81  The 
availability of debt, too, is likely inadequate, according to 
Hansmann, as lenders are seldom willing to provide enough 
capital for all of a firm’s needs.82 
Thus, the sole remaining, semireliable source of capital for a 
nonprofit is retained earnings.83  By allowing nonprofits to 
accumulate retained earnings tax-free, the tax code essentially 
gives these firms a lifeline for their need to raise capital.  Not 
only can tax-exempt organizations use the money they are not 
paying in taxes on capital expenditures, but also their increased 
cash flow as a result of not having to pay taxes will encourage 
lenders to extend them more debt financing, creating a double 
benefit.84  In Hansmann’s words, “the exemption can be 
understood as a subsidy to capital formation.”85 
While the Capital Formation Theory does seem to provide a 
unique alternative justification for the exemption, it too is not 
without its faults.  Hansmann himself recognizes the most 
prominent of these issues, which is that “an exemption from 
income taxation is a crude mechanism for subsidizing capital 
formation in the nonprofit sector.”86  In industries where growth 
?
76 Id. at 66–67. 
77 Id. at 58–62. 
78 Id. at 72. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 72–73. 
82 Id. at 73. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 73–74. 
85 Id. at 74. 
86 Id. at 75. 
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is particularly strong, the benefits provided by the exemption are 
not enough to provide sufficient capital for expansion.87  
Conversely, there exist industries where nonprofit firms are 
significantly overcapitalized and the exemption is essentially 
handing free money to firms that do not need it.88  If 
subsidization of nonprofit sectors in need of capital was the goal 
of Congress, enacting a blanket exemption for all  
nonprofits—that fall within § 501(c) and (d)—is a horribly 
inefficient solution. 
The United States government is no stranger to directly 
subsidizing individual industries—look no further than the 
renewable energy industry.89  Therefore, if the concern is that 
nonprofits in certain sectors will be unable to raise sufficient 
capital to survive and compete with their for-profit counterparts, 
Congress certainly has the tools at its disposal to directly 
subsidize those industries without also handing over tax dollars 
to nonprofits in industries without capital constraints. 
Further, it is not clear that nonprofit firms will be 
systematically undercapitalized rather than overcapitalized.90  
Hansmann assumes that the norm for a nonprofit in an industry 
will be for it to be undercapitalized, but what if that is the 
exception and the far more common occurrence is the 
overcapitalization of nonprofits, in which case, tax money is 
being wasted on firms that do not need it?  Hansmann 
acknowledges that there may be instances in which the 
exemption should be withdrawn for industries that find  
themselves to be overcapitalized.91  But is this cherry picking 
approach not the same as simply directly subsidizing those 
?
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 See Federal Financial Support for Energy Technologies—Assessing Costs and 
Benefits: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy of the H. Comm. on Sci., Space, 
and Tech., 113th Cong. 17–18 (2013) (statement of Terry Dinan, CBO Senior 
Advisor), available at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113hhrg79931/ 
pdf/CHRG-113hhrg79931.pdf. 
90 Daniel Shaviro, Assessing the “Contract Failure” Explanation for Nonprofit 
Organizations and Their Tax-Exempt Status, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1001, 1006 
(1997). 
91 See Henry Hansmann, The Changing Roles of Public, Private, and Nonprofit 
Enterprise in Education, Health Care, and Other Human Services, in INDIVIDUAL 
AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: CHILD CARE, EDUCATION, MEDICAL CARE, AND  
LONG-TERM CARE IN AMERICA 245, 255 (Victor R. Fuchs ed., 1996). 
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industries where undercapitalization is problematic, which is 
also a much more efficient solution to the issue? 
All told, Hansmann’s Capital Formation Theory goes a long 
way toward justifying the income tax exemption for some 
nonprofits.92  However, it is hardly a comprehensive justification 
that can be applied to all nonprofits that receive the exemption.  
Perhaps Professors Hall and Colombo can offer a more universal 
justification with their Donative Theory of Tax Exemption.93 
4. The Donative Theory 
Beginning in 1991, Professors Mark Hall and John Colombo 
published a series of articles, examining the commonly discussed 
justifications for income tax exemption at the time,94 finding 
them all lacking—do you notice a trend developing here?—and 
offering their own rationale for exempting nonprofits from 
income taxation.95  Hall and Colombo name their concept the 
Donative Theory, largely because its key aspect is the evaluation 
of nonprofits to determine whether they are worthy of being 
supported by the public through donations.96 
In order to evaluate different justifications for income tax 
exemption, Hall and Colombo create a framework of four criteria 
against which to judge possible theories.97  Their view of a 
successful theory is as follows: 
Such a theory should: (1) identify activities deserving social 
subsidy . . . (2) distribute the subsidy in rough proportion to the 
degree of deservedness; (3) explain both the income tax and the 
property tax exemption, and, ideally, explain the related 
charitable deduction as well as the various operational  
constraints that attach to charitable status and (4) align 
generally with an intuitive concept of what constitutes a charity 
and the major historical categories of exempt entities.98 
?
92 The nonprofits the Capital Formation Theory aids are namely those in need of 
capital. 
93 See Hall & Colombo, supra note 49, at 307. 
94 These commonly discussed justifications include, namely, the Public Good 
Theory, Bittker and Rahdert’s Income Measurement Argument, and Hansmann’s 
Capital Formation Theory. 
95 See Hall & Colombo, supra note 49, at 307; Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, 
The Donative Theory of the Charitable Tax Exemption, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1379,  
1382–84 (1991) [hereinafter Hall & Colombo, The Donative Theory]. 
96 Hall & Colombo, supra note 49, at 316. 
97 Id. at 328. 
98 Id. 
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Generally, these criteria seem helpful.  However, it is 
unclear that the income tax exemption, property tax exemption, 
and deductibility of donations must necessarily go hand-in-hand 
with one another.  For purposes of this Article, the income tax 
exemption alone is considered—with more discussion on the 
deductibility of donations to come—and setting aside the 
property tax exemption for the time being.99  The fourth criterion 
exists as an acknowledgment that the “charitable exemption has 
evolved throughout centuries of experience to take on an almost 
universal presence and shape.”100  It also shows that a “complete 
reformulation or abandonment is impossible to contemplate for 
both political and pragmatic reasons.”101  However, it seems to be 
a bit of a cop out.  If we already hold an “intuitive” idea of what 
charities are and why they deserve special treatment, then why 
go through the trouble of justifying the exemption in the first 
place?  Is it not possible that a truly satisfactory theory of 
exemption might indeed turn some of our traditional notions 
about nonprofits on their heads?102 
Regardless, Hall and Colombo have given us a useful tool for 
judging a theory of exemption, which they proceed to apply to 
Bittker and Rahdert’s Income Measurement Theory103 as well as 
to Hansmann’s Capital Formation Theory.104  Not surprisingly, 
they find that neither theory measures up particularly well,105 
which leads them to introduce their Donative Theory of 
Exemption.106 
Under the Donative Theory of Exemption, “the primary 
rationale for the charitable exemption is to subsidize those 
organizations capable of attracting a substantial level of donative 
support from the public.”107  When a public good is not provided 
to the optimally desired level by the government and such good is 
?
99 See the discussion of the importance of the property tax exemption infra note 
195. 
100 Hall & Colombo, supra note 49, at 331. 
101 Id. 
102 Indeed, Hall and Colombo proceed to make a case for eliminating the 
exemption for nonprofit hospitals, a class of charitable organization that has 
certainly traditionally been exempt from income tax. See Hall and Colombo, supra 
note 49, at 405–08. 
103 Id. at 385–86. 
104 Id. at 387. 
105 Id. at 385–89. 
106 Id. at 389. 
107 Id. at 390. 
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also not available in the private market largely due to free-rider 
problems, a confluence of both government failure and market 
failure emerges.108  For these types of public goods, the only 
mechanism by which those who desire the good can realize its 
production is to make a donation toward the creation of that 
good.109 
So how does the Donative Theory measure up?  Under Hall 
and Colombo’s own analysis, the results are mixed.  It certainly 
succeeds in identifying activities deserving social subsidy; after 
all, if private citizens are voluntarily contributing their  
hard-earned dollars toward a public good, there is a good chance 
such good is worthy of subsidy.  However, the authors admit  
that the results of the proportionality test “seem[] 
unsatisfactory.”110  They attempt to resolve this unsatisfactory 
result by using some circular logic, though.  Essentially, their 
argument recognizes that the income tax exemption under the 
Donative Theory is probably not the best way to ensure tax 
support in proportion to deservedness and that a much better 
mechanism would be direct government support of deserving 
firms.111  However, if a firm is the recipient of direct government 
support to produce its public good, then it must necessarily not 
require donations, removing it from analysis under the Donative 
Theory.112  Is it not possible to identify those firms producing 
public goods that are receiving donations and then inject direct 
subsidies?  It is not clear that donative support and direct 
government subsidization are mutually exclusive. 
Hall and Colombo give lip service to the historical 
consistency criterion,113 but it is not obvious that it is as easily 
satisfied as they claim.  True, donative charities—for example, 
churches, schools, or homeless shelters—are certainly historically 
what people think of when they consider tax exempt 
organizations, but what of organizations that have long been 
exempt and derive a significant portion of their revenue from 
commercial activities and not just donations?  Indeed, the 
authors themselves make a case for eliminating the exemption 
?
108 Id. at 394. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 403. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 404. 
113 Id. at 405. 
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for nonprofit hospitals,114 which seems likely to violate the 
criterion that the theory must comport with our intuitive 
concepts of the nature of charities and respect the historical 
categories of such organizations.  Hall and Colombo acknowledge 
that their Donative Theory is a “significant retraction of the 
existing scope of the charitable exemption,”115 which seems to be 
at odds with their stated desire to remain aligned with the 
“major historical categories of exempt entities.”116  And what 
about organizations that receive both donations and revenue 
from commercial activity?  Or, to add a layer of complication, 
what if an organization receives direct government subsidies, 
donations, and revenue from commercial activities?  Does the 
Donative Theory apply to such an organization? 
Again, like the Capital Formation Theory, the Donative 
Theory seems to work quite nicely for a certain subset of 
nonprofit organizations, namely those that are supported 
through donations.  But for nonprofits that receive revenue from 
sources other than just donations, the theory leads to 
inconsistent results.  Take, for instance, the Susan G. Komen 
Breast Cancer Foundation.  In fiscal year 2014, the organization 
recorded revenues of nearly $130 million.117  However, less than 
thirty-six million of that amount was attributable to direct 
donations,118 with the remaining revenue coming from 
merchandise sales, fundraising events—primarily the series of 
road races put on throughout the country—and other commercial 
activities.119  Would the Donative Theory remove the exemption  
from the Komen Foundation because only about a quarter of its 
revenue comes from donations?  It is unclear, which is an 
unsatisfying result. 
 
?
114 Id. at 405–08. 
115 Hall & Colombo, The Donative Theory, supra note 95, at 1416. 
116 Hall & Colombo, supra note 49, at 328. 
117 Susan G. Komen, 2013–2014 Form 990 Parent Return, SUSAN G. KOMEN, 
http://ww5.komen.org/uploadedFiles/_Komen/Content/About_Us/Financial_Reports/
SGK%20Parent_990_PIC_Final_EY%20signed_to%20client.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 
2016). 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
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5. Other Theories 
As mentioned, there is no shortage of scholarly attempts to 
justify the income tax exemption for nonprofits.  The theories 
discussed above are perhaps the most notable examples from the 
legal academia, but several others deserve mention. 
In his 1990 article, Rob Atkinson finds Hansmann’s theory 
useful yet unsatisfying, so he adds another layer to it and 
suggests that those nonprofits worthy of tax exemption are the 
organizations that operate out of altruism, or “the conferring of 
uncompensated benefits.”120  The lovely thing about Professor 
Atkinson’s model is that virtually all organizations we 
traditionally think of when we think of nonprofits fit nicely into 
his framework justifying tax exemption.  The aspect of the 
altruism theory that is perhaps troubling to some is that it would  
likely confer the tax exemption on any number of firms engaged 
in businesses we do not typically associate with tax exemption, a 
fact that Professor Atkinson acknowledges.121 
Nina Crimm provides an analysis of Atkinson’s altruism 
theory, as well as all of the other theories described thus far in 
her 1998 article.  She not surprisingly concludes that “no 
proffered explanation has yet extended a full and satisfactory 
explanation that can be universally applied and has been widely 
accepted.”122  She then proceeds to offer her own theory, which is 
that tax subsidies for nonprofits compensate them for engaging 
in the provision of public goods, an inherently risky endeavor.123  
The tax benefits serve to offset some measure of the risk and 
thereby create a market for public goods where one would not 
have otherwise existed.124  In a sense, Professor Crimm’s 
rationale resembles the Public Good Theory, but couched in the 
terminology of economics. 
To solve the inefficiency problems associated with the Public 
Good Theory, Crimm separates the theory justifying the 
exemption from the analysis of the deservedness of any 
?
120 Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REV. 501, 565 
(1990). 
121 Id. at 510. 
122 Nina J. Crimm, An Explanation of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for 
Charitable Organizations: A Theory of Risk Compensation, 50 FLA. L. REV. 419,  
438–39 (1998). 
123 Id. at 462. 
124 Id. 
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particular organization to receive the exemption.125  By doing so, 
only those nonprofits that operate for worthy charitable purposes 
can claim the subsidy.126  Professor Crimm’s proposal is certainly 
thoughtful and insightful, but it is not immediately clear that the 
provision of public goods and services is as inherently risky as 
she claims, nor is it clear that the risk of providing public goods 
would deter entrepreneurs in the absence of the tax exemption. 
Finally, the most compelling justification for the income tax 
exemption comes from Evelyn Brody’s 1998 article, in which she 
maintains that charitable organizations have a certain amount of 
sovereignty into which the government refuses to intrude.127  In 
Professor Brody’s words, “[c]harities go untaxed because Caesar 
should not tax God (or the modern secular equivalent).”128  Brody 
probably gives the government more credit than most of us 
would, as it certainly seems that the government rarely has a 
problem inserting itself into practically any facet of life.  Brody’s 
theory is thoughtful, but seems difficult to apply to individual 
organizations.  For example, what makes a nonprofit hospital 
any more sovereign than its for-profit counterpart? 
6. Conclusions from Current Theories of Income Tax 
Exemption 
Clearly, a bevy of legal scholars have come up with some 
very creative and thought-provoking justifications for exempting 
nonprofit organizations from income taxation.  Whether they 
approached the issue from the perspective of an economist, 
philosopher, or legal theorist, each contribution put a new twist 
on the answer to the question of why we exempt certain nonprofit 
firms from income taxation. 
Unfortunately, while some theories seemed to work quite 
well for a subset of nonprofits, none of the theories left us feeling 
satisfied when applied across all of the categories of nonprofit 
organizations out there.  There was never that moment when the 
light bulb flicked on and we said, “Aha! That is the reason why 
we do not tax the profits of charitable organizations.”  Instead, 
we could make statements such as “that could be a good reason 
?
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Evelyn Brody, Of Sovereignty and Subsidy: Conceptualizing the Charity Tax 
Exemption, 23 J. CORP. L. 585, 586 (1998). 
128 Id. 
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for not taxing undercapitalized nonprofits,” or “this could be a 
good reason for not taxing organizations that provide public 
goods and are supported substantially by donations from the 
public.” 
Absent a comprehensive theory that fits all exempt entities 
equally well, the average person, when attempting to justify the 
exemption, is likely to fall back on the well-worn rationale that 
most nonprofits are engaged in the kinds of activities that we 
want to support as a society, so we give them an income tax 
exemption for it.  It is not scientific, and it is definitely not easy 
to test, but that seems to be the best justification we have at this 
point that fits equally well for all exempt nonprofits. 
So if our best theory is unsatisfactory and unscientific, and 
our best scientific theories are also unsatisfactory—and fail to 
include broad swaths of exempt entities—where do we go from 
here?  Should we even care?  The nonprofit sector seems to have 
functioned fairly well for the last 100-plus years, so why rock a 
stable boat? 
As mentioned in the Introduction, nonprofits do not exist in a 
vacuum;129 they are subsidized by tax dollars and society has 
certain expectations of them.  If we cannot provide a satisfactory, 
universal rationale for exempting nonprofits from income 
taxation, perhaps it is time to revisit the fundamentals of how 
the tax code treats nonprofits. 
II. THE PROBLEM 
In 2013, Harvard University made a profit of $1.25 billion.130  
The same year, the Howard Hughes Medical Institute in 
Maryland made a profit of almost $299 million,131 the New York 
Metropolitan Museum of Art made a profit of $169 million,132 
Yale University profited to the tune of $370 million,133 and the 
?
129 See supra Part I. 
130 Harvard University, Form 990, FOUND. CENTER (2012), http://990s.found 
ationcenter.org/990_pdf_archive/042/042103580/042103580_201306_990.pdf. 
131 Howard Hughes Medical Center, Form 990, FOUND. CENTER (2012), 
http://990s.foundationcenter.org/990_pdf_archive/590/590735717/590735717_201308
_990.pdf. 
132 Metropolitan Museum of Art, Form 990, FOUND. CENTER (2012) 
http://990s.foundationcenter.org/990_pdf_archive/131/131624086/131624086_201306
_990.pdf. 
133 Yale University, Form 990, FOUND. CENTER (2012) http://990s.foundation 
center.org/990_pdf_archive/060/060646973/060646973_201306_990.pdf. 
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Kaiser Foundation Hospitals racked up profits of $1.76 billion.134  
As nonprofits, each of these organizations is prohibited from 
distributing its profits to private persons and must do one of 
three things with its revenue: spend it, give it to another 
nonprofit, or save it. 
If you are wondering which of the three options these 
organizations chose, consider that in 2013, Harvard’s net 
assets—of which its endowment is the largest  
component—increased by $2.26 billion,135 Howard Hughes’s by 
$1.12 billion,136 the Metropolitan Museum of Art’s by $280 
million,137 Yale’s by $1.87 billion,138 and Kaiser’s by $2.26 
billion.139 
These five nonprofits are nothing more than a random 
sampling of some of the largest tax exempt organizations in the 
United States.  When nine and ten-figure profits roll in, by and 
large the excess is simply put into the bank.140  And 2013 was 
hardly a banner year for nonprofit profits.  In the past ten years, 
Kaiser Foundation Hospital’s worst year, 2004, still saw a net 
profit of $706 million.141  Lest you think the above examples were 
cherry-picked due to their atypically large profits, the following 
tables show the total profits and contributions to the 
endowment142 for the most recent year143 for the ten largest 
nonprofits, by total assets, in the following fields: education in 
Table 1, health care in Table 2, and arts in Table 3. 
?
134 Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, Form 990, FOUND. CENTER (2012) 
http://990s.foundationcenter.org/990_pdf_archive/941/941105628/941105628_201212
_990.pdf. 
135 Harvard University, supra note 130. 
136 Howard Hughes Medical Center, supra note 131. 
137 Metropolitan Museum of Art, supra note 132. 
138 Yale University, supra note 133. 
139 Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, supra note 134. 
140 See Harvard University, supra note 130; Howard Hughes Medical Center, 
supra note 131; Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, supra note 134; Metropolitan Museum 
of Art, supra note 132; Yale University, supra note 133. 
141 Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, Form 990, FOUND. CENTER (2003), 
http://990s.foundationcenter.org/990_pdf_archive/941/941105628/941105628_200312
_990.pdf. 
142 For the most part, the healthcare nonprofits listed in Table 2 do not list 
endowments, so this column is replaced by the change in net assets for this table. 
This figure is admittedly an inferior tool for determining contributions to 
endowments, as it includes investment gains and losses, with which we are not 
presently concerned. 
143 The year is typically 2013, but 2012 for those entries noted with an asterisk. 
FINAL_FRICKE 6/28/2016  2:36 PM 
2015] INCOME TAX EXEMPTION FOR NONPROFITS 1155 
Table 1: Ten Largest Educational Nonprofits by Total Assets144 
Name 2013 Net Profit (Loss) 2013 Contribution to 
Endowment 
Harvard University $1,258,436,182 $320,079,000
Stanford 
University 
$635,720,686 $588,438,000
Yale University $370,048,914 $147,031,000
Princeton 
University 
($1,383,273,000) 145 $153,855,000
Massachusetts 
Institute of 
Technology 
($29,168,000)* $180,985,000* 
University of 
Pennsylvania 
$783,502,000 $327,276,900
Columbia 
University 
$683,454,335 $165,932,000
Harvard 
Management 
Private Equity 
Corporation 
$1,148,851,664 N/A
Cornell University $160,497,600 $142,698,495
Emory University $308,040,859 $90,867,213
Total: $3,936,111,240 $2,117,162,608 
*2012 figures 
 
 
 
 
 
?
144 Display Largest Public Charities, NAT’L CENTER FOR CHARITABLE STAT., 
http://nccsweb.urban.org/PubApps/showTopOrgs.php?cat=B&amt=ass_eoy (last 
visited Feb. 28, 2016) (deriving figures from annual IRS form 990 filings); Cornell 
University, Form 990, FOUND. CENTER (2012), http://990s.foundationcenter.org/ 
990_pdf_archive/150/150532082/150532082_201306_990.pdf; Emory University, 
Form 990, FOUND. CENTER (2011), http://990s.foundationcenter.org/990_pdf_ 
archive/580/580566256/580566256_201308_990.pdf?_ga=1.54794667.1899948767.14
57700995; University of Pennsylvania, Form 990, FOUND. CENTER (2012), 
http://990s.foundationcenter.org/990_pdf_archive/231/231352685/231352685_201306
_990.pdf?_ga=1.59314989.1899948767.1457700995. 
145 Princeton University, Form 990, FOUND. CENTER 1, 9 (2012), 
http://990s.foundationcenter.org/990_pdf_archive/210/210634501/210634501_201306
_990.pdf?_ga=1.75079058.1051194472.1438123364 (finding that Princeton took a 
$952 million loss on the sale of assets during 2013). 
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Table 2: Ten Largest Health Care Nonprofits by Total Assets146 
Name 2013 Net Profit (Loss) 2013 Gain (Loss) in 
Net Assets 
Kaiser Foundation 
Hospitals 
$1,765,755,591* $2,260,324,417* 
Howard Hughes 
Medical Institute 
$298,960,625 $1,119,897,181 
Kaiser Foundation 
Health Plan 
$565,728,568* ($254,772,349)* 
Partners Health 
Care System 
$451,573,093* $238,907,656* 
Dignity Health $401,154,604 $1,154,450,512 
Cleveland Clinic $451,637,135* $643,241,094* 
Trinity Health $233,862,773* ($264,416,814)* 
Mayo Clinic $245,898,463* ($335,916,168)* 
Shriners Hospitals 
for Children 
$5,364,512* $372,326,228* 
Memorial Sloan 
Kettering Cancer 
Center 
$96,441,000* $291,890,000* 
Total: $4,516,376,364 $5,225,931,757 
*2012 figures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
?
146 Display Largest Public Charities, supra note 144; Trinity Health Corporation, 
Form 990, FOUND. CENTER (2011), http://990s.foundationcenter.org/990_pdf_archive/ 
351/351443425/351443425_201206_990.pdf?_ga=1.213956887.1899948767.14577009
95. 
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Table 3: Ten Largest Arts Nonprofits by Total Assets147 
Name 2013 Net Profit (Loss) 2013 Contribution to 
Endowment 
Cambridge 
University Press 
$136,242,148 $1,415,683,500 
Smithsonian 
Institution 
$168,546,753 $34,861,990
New York 
Metropolitan 
Museum of Art 
$168,988,217 $28,031,302
National Trust $23,964,000 $19,346,000
Colonial 
Williamsburg 
Foundation 
($20,886,575)* $9,617,265*
New York Museum 
of Modern Art 
($6,720,774) $37,247,000
Boston Museum of 
Fine Arts 
($8,856,309) $8,719,819
American Museum 
of Natural History 
$7,978,832 $7,844,856
Museum of Fine 
Arts Houston 
$141,253,961 $1,462,414
National Gallery of 
Art 
$52,169,003* $6,515,424*
Total: $662,679,256 $1,569,329,570 
*2012 figures 
 
Clearly, for the largest nonprofits, business is good.  Even 
counting Princeton’s unusual $1.38 billion loss, the top ten 
educational nonprofits still netted an average of almost $400 
million each in 2013.148  Likewise, the top hospitals profited more 
than $450 million each, on average.149  While the arts nonprofits 
earned a mere sixty-six million each, on average,150 one must 
remember that museums do not enjoy the steady flow of revenue 
from tuition or health insurance reimbursement that colleges 
and hospitals do. 
?
147 Display Largest Public Charities, supra note 144. 
148 See supra Table 1 (taking the average from the 2013 Net Profit column). 
149 See supra Table 2 (taking the average from the 2013 Net Profit column). 
150 See supra Table 3 (taking the average from the 2013 Net Profit column). 
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The fact that tax-exempt entities earn large profits is not, in 
and of itself, particularly troubling.  Budgeting expenditures 
against anticipated revenues is an inexact science, and ending a 
year with a surplus typically means either that revenues were 
unexpectedly greater than anticipated or that the firm’s 
managers were diligent in keeping expenses down.  In a for-profit 
business, this is great news.  However, in the tax-exempt world, 
when firms post significant profits year after year, closer scrutiny 
is mandated.  As previously stated, society has certain 
expectations of nonprofits, and the fact that they are subsidized 
by tax dollars necessitates a higher standard of accountability. 
If these profits were consistently being used to further the 
tax-exempt organization’s charitable purposes, then it stands to 
reason that society would be satisfied.  However, most of the 
wealthiest nonprofits in this country not only earn significant 
profits annually, but they also have a tendency to stock those 
profits away, building endowments seemingly simply for the sake 
of having a large endowment.  Indeed, it has been argued that 
the nation’s elite universities work so hard to build up their 
endowments, not because they have grand designs for the future 
of education, but because a large endowment is itself an indicator 
of prestige.151 
The purpose of an endowment for a college should be to 
protect the school’s education and research programs in the event 
of an economic downturn.152  Similarly, a hospital’s endowment 
should exist to sustain a level of patient care and medical 
research when revenues are less than expected,153 and museum 
endowments should enable the institution to advance cultural 
education and preserve cultural heritage even when donations 
and admissions receipts decline.154  These seem to be legitimate 
reasons to have an endowment.  But what happens when the 
organization begins to serve the endowment instead of the other 
way around? 
?
151 Peter Conti-Brown, Note, Scarcity Amidst Wealth: The Law, Finance, and 
Culture of Elite University Endowments in Financial Crisis, 63 STAN. L. REV. 699, 
699 (2011). 
152 Burton A. Weisbrod & Evelyn D. Asch, Endowment for a Rainy Day, 2010 
STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. 42, 44, available at http://www.ssireview.org/ 
articles/entry/endowment_for_a_rainy_day. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
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When Hurricane Katrina shut down Tulane University in 
2005, the school’s total revenue dropped ten percent between 
fiscal years 2005 and 2006.155  Being temporarily closed by a 
hurricane and spending many months cleaning up the aftermath 
would likely qualify as one of the more extreme examples of a 
“downturn” imaginable, and even then, Tulane’s revenues were 
only off by ten percent.156  Using this ten percent drop as an 
example of an extreme decline in revenues, Burton Weisbrod and 
Evelyn Asch calculated the length of time certain nonprofits 
could continue operating without making a single spending cut, 
simply by dipping into their endowments.157  The results are 
surprising. 
Weisbrod and Asch determined that the average hospital 
could function for five years at full steam even with a ten percent 
drop in revenue, simply by using its endowment.158  The average 
college could maintain all of its programs in their entirety for 
twenty-one years, and the average museum could operate for 
thirty-seven years under the same conditions.159  Getting more 
specific, they found that Princeton University’s endowment was 
sufficient to keep the school humming along for 141 years, 
Harvard for ninety-six years, the Metropolitan Museum of Art for 
ninety years, the Boston Symphony Orchestra for fifty-three 
years, and small Grinnell College for a whopping 191 years.160 
Taken alone, these numbers are not necessarily good or bad.  
Who cares if a nonprofit has a large endowment?  Is that not 
simply evidence of its management’s wise decision making?  
Perhaps; but American taxpayers subsidized a sizable chunk of 
each of those endowments.  Even nonprofits that get almost no 
revenue from donations—like many hospitals—enjoy the benefit 
of taxpayer subsidy through the income tax exemption.  If 
taxpayers are subsidizing these nonprofits, should they not also 
have some oversight concerning the use, or nonuse, of their 
funds? 
?
155 Id. at 45. 
156 Id. at 46. 
157 Id. at 46–47. Weisbrod and Asch’s figures are from 2010, so the specific 
figures may have changed, but the general trajectory remains the same. If anything, 
the continuing recovery of the U.S. economy is likely to have inflated endowments 
even more in the intervening years. 
158 Id. at 46. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. at 47. 
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As another example, consider hospital endowments.  While 
Professor Hansmann may argue that nonprofits can have a 
difficult time securing debt financing,161 health insurers are a 
very reliable revenue stream that has made many nonprofit 
hospitals exceptionally creditworthy.162  Most nonprofit hospitals 
are able to issue tax-exempt debt—the interest payments are not 
taxable income to the lender—which carries a much lower 
interest rate than taxable debt, since the lender is realizing 
significant savings by receiving the interest tax-free.163  William 
Gentry’s 2002 study determined that almost sixty percent of all 
hospital debt was issued for the purpose of engaging in tax 
arbitrage.164  That is, the hospital has an endowment sufficient to 
supply the organization’s capital needs, but the endowment earns 
a greater return on investment than the hospital would have to 
pay on the tax-exempt debt.  For example, the endowment might 
be earning a ten percent annual return whereas the hospital 
might have to pay seven percent interest on its debt.  So, the 
hospital finances its operations through debt instead of using its 
savings because it is cheaper that way.165 
What enables hospitals to take advantage of such a 
profitable scheme?  The benefits of the tax code for nonprofits, of 
course.  In this example, taxpayers are subsidizing the hospital 
in two separate ways.  First, the hospital received the revenues 
that created its endowment tax-free, as are almost all revenues 
for exempt entities.  Second, the only reason the hospital is able 
to sell debt at such a low interest rate is because the government 
is forgoing the opportunity to receive any tax revenue on the 
interest payments made to the lenders.  Thus, the tax coffers 
miss out on two opportunities for revenue while the hospital’s 
endowment balloons.  With such a sweet deal why would a 
nonprofit hospital spend one penny of its endowment, ever? 
Indeed, evidence shows that even during the severe financial 
crisis beginning around 2008, endowment-holding institutions 
were so loath to dip into their savings that they cut programs 
and expenditures rather than siphon funds from their 
?
161 Hansmann, supra note 7, at 73. 
162 William M. Gentry, Debt, Investment and Endowment Accumulation: The 
Case of Not-for-profit Hospitals, 21 J. HEALTH ECON. 845, 848 (2002). 
163 Id. 
164 Id. at 846. 
165 Id. at 851, 855. 
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endowments.166  If a serious recession—the worst since the Great 
Depression, we were told ad nauseum—was not enough to cause 
a nonprofit to use its endowment funds, what on earth possibly 
could be? 
The purpose of this Article is not to criticize organizations 
that accumulate massive endowments.167  If an organization 
determines that the best course of action is to amass a large 
reserve, it should be able to do just that.  The problem arises, 
however, when taxpayers provide a substantial portion of that 
money and it ends up parked in an investment somewhere, never 
to be used for the organization’s charitable purposes.168 
This seems wrong for two reasons:  It is immoral, and it is 
wasteful.  First, implicit in the exemption for nonprofits is the 
expectation that such firms will use their public subsidy to 
actually benefit the public.  When a firm receives taxpayer 
dollars, does it not have a moral duty to use those dollars in the 
agreed-upon manner?  The federal government directly 
subsidizes all sorts of things; if the recipients of those direct 
subsidies took the money, put it in the bank, and never used it 
for anything, how long do you think the government would 
continue providing such subsidies? 
The second objection to the current practice of using tax 
dollars to build impenetrable endowments is that it is wasteful.  
A nonprofit hospital engaged in tax arbitrage does not need an 
income tax exemption.  But, since it has one, it does what any 
rational actor would do and uses it to its full advantage.  The 
federal budget is still pretty severely in the red, and to be 
granting blanket tax exemptions to organizations that clearly do 
not need it seems like a poor policy. 
?
166 Weisbrod & Asch, supra note 152, at 45; see also Tuition and Fees and Room 
and Board over Time, 2005–06 to 2015–16, COLLEGE BOARD, 
http://trends.collegeboard.org/college-pricing/figures-tables/tuition-fees-room-board-
time-2004-05-2014-15 (last visited Feb. 28, 2016). Further, from 2008 to 2014, 
tuition at private colleges rose an average of sixteen percent and tuition of public 
universities an average of twenty-eight percent. 
167 Indeed, this author believes it to be the mark of a well-run organization 
doing what any rationale manager would do. 
168 There is, of course, the argument that some portions of most endowments—
especially those of colleges and universities—are restricted and therefore cannot be 
used by the institution, even if it wanted to. Given the fungible nature of money and 
the manner in which donations are typically made, that argument has been soundly 
discredited. See Conti-Brown, supra note 151; Weisbrod & Asch, supra note 152, at 
46. 
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There does, however, seem to be a relatively simple solution 
to this problem.  It will surely be a tough sell, politically, but it 
has the potential to reign in the out-of-control accumulation of 
wealth by the largest nonprofits yet keep in place all of the 
benefits enjoyed by those nonprofits that use their funds 
diligently for the betterment of society.  Before we arrive at this 
Article’s proposed solution, let us take a moment to discuss other 
recent proposals for reforming the nonprofit sector. 
III. OTHER PROPOSED REFORMS 
Several scholars have suggested changes to the tax code as it 
pertains to nonprofits in recent years.  While none has gone quite 
so far as an outright elimination of the income tax exemption, 
some have gotten close, and still others have come up with some 
rather creative proposals for reforming nonprofit tax laws. 
A. Mandatory Distributions for University Endowments 
A number of articles has addressed the potential of 
extending the mandatory distribution requirements for private 
foundation endowments to reach the endowments of public 
charities, especially universities.  While Congress has never 
voted on such measures, it has certainly been the subject of 
legislative inquiry,169 and at least one short-lived amendment, 
which would have required mandatory payouts for university 
endowments in excess of $500 million, was introduced.170 
In general, however, legal scholars have tended to resist any 
suggestion to impose mandatory endowment payouts for public 
charities.  In his thoughtful discussion of university endowments, 
Mark Cowan examines the rationales both in favor of and 
opposed to mandating minimum payments or imposing tax on 
endowment income and concludes that both are generally ill- 
 
 
 
 
?
169 See Alexander M. Wolf, Note, The Problems with Payouts: Assessing the 
Proposal for a Mandatory Distribution Requirement for University Endowments, 48 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 591, 597–98 (2011). 
170 Id. at 598. 
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advised.171  Similarly, in his 2010 article, Johnny Rex Buckles 
advised Congress to use caution in considering whether to tax 
endowments of universities and other donative nonprofits.172 
At this time, scholarly sentiment certainly seems to tilt in 
favor of permitting nonprofits to make their own determinations 
as to the best use of their endowment funds.  The proposal set 
forth in Part V of this Article is consistent with this line of 
reasoning. 
B. The Addition of a “Nondiversion” Constraint for Nonprofits 
In her 2003 article, Frances Hill seeks to answer a very 
similar problem that is raised in this Article when she inquires, 
“[W]hether the diversification of the activities to exempt 
organizations to encompass commercial and political activities is 
consistent with charitable efficiency.”173  Put differently, she 
addresses the issue of nonprofit organizations that receive tax 
benefits but do not use their revenues in furtherance of their 
charitable purposes. 
Instead of a solution that seeks to recover taxpayer subsidies 
from firms that earn significant profits without ever using 
them—as this Article does—Professor Hill suggests 
implementation of what she terms a “nondiversion constraint,”174 
which would penalize nonprofits for using funds to finance 
activities inconsistent with their core charitable purpose.175  
Professor Hill’s nondiversion constraint is generally consistent 
with the proposal set forth in this Article.  Whereas the 
nondiversion constraint seeks to ensure that money spent by  
 
 
?
171 Mark J. Cowan, Taxing and Regulating College and University Endowment 
Income: The Literature’s Perspective, 34 J.C. & U.L. 507, 510–11 (2008). Professor 
Cowan bases his conclusions “on our current understanding of how colleges and 
universities should be taxed,” which arguably is less settled than Professor Cowan’s 
article suggests. Id. at 511. 
172 Johnny Rex Buckles, Should the Private Foundation Excise Tax on Failure 
To Distribute Income Generally Apply to “Private Foundation Substitutes”? 
Evaluating the Taxation of Various Models of Charitable Entities, 44 NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 493, 539 (2010). 
173 Frances R. Hill, Targeting Exemption for Charitable Efficiency: Designing a 
Nondiversion Constraint, 56 SMU L. REV. 675, 678 (2003). 
174 Id. at 708–09. 
175 Id. 
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nonprofits actually goes to fund charitable activities,176 this 
Article’s suggestions seek to address the problem of nonprofits 
hoarding profits without ever spending them at all.177 
C. Elimination of Barriers Between Nonprofit and For-Profit 
Enterprises 
In recent years, several commentators have highlighted the 
distinction between nonprofit and for-profit organizations, with 
the conclusion being that perhaps the two are not as different as 
previously believed.  “It is always startling when a distinction 
long believed to be a difference of kind turns out to be a 
difference of degree,” notes Evelyn Brody, going on to argue that 
the similarities between nonprofits and for-profits seem to 
greatly outnumber the differences.178  While the purpose of 
Professor Brody’s article is to analyze the nonprofit and for-profit 
distinction from an economic perspective, she does briefly note: 
Should the public cease to view enterprises in terms of their 
organizational form, we would likely see subsidies tailored more 
towards worthy outputs by all enterprises, owned and unowned.  
Society might conclude, for example, that transforming 
monolithic tax exemption into targeted output subsidies makes 
more efficient and fair use of collective resources.179 
Although she does not expand upon the concept of targeted 
output subsidies, except to say that it would likely be appropriate 
to offer such subsidies to all firms regardless of nonprofit 
status,180 such a notion fits nicely with the proposal made in this 
Article.  Part V, below, suggests a shift in the treatment of 
nonprofits such that, instead of granting tax breaks based on 
organizational form, we should provide subsidies corresponding 
to the actual use of funds in furtherance of a nonprofit purpose.181 
?
176 Id. at 709. 
177 See infra Part V.B–C. 
178 Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals: The Economic Convergence of the 
Nonprofit and For-Profit Organizational Forms, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457, 457–58 
(1996). Indeed, the average consumer would be hard-pressed to be able to recognize 
the difference between a for-profit hospital and a nonprofit hospital simply by the 
service provided by each. The same seems generally true for for-profit and nonprofit 
colleges, thrift shops, and the like. 
179 Id. at 536. 
180 Id. at 461. 
181 See infra Part V. 
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Along similar lines, Susannah Camic Tahk noted, in her 
2014 article, that both nonprofits and for-profits tend to cross the 
boundaries of their sectors in certain instances, even though the 
tax code is specifically structured to keep those boundaries 
clear.182  Because of this border-crossing activity, Professor Tahk 
recommends various changes to the tax code, which will not only 
permit such activity, but also harness it to create incentives for 
both nonprofit and proprietary firms to create more social good 
through border-crossing behavior.183 
Taking the idea of a merger of the nonprofit and proprietary 
form yet another step further, Anup Malani and Eric Posner, in 
their 2007 article, recommended decoupling tax subsidies from 
the nonprofit form, and making tax breaks available to all 
organizations engaged in charitable activities, even proprietary 
firms.184  Malani and Posner characterize their issue as “the flip 
side of the UBIT debate: should for-profit firms be taxed like 
nonprofit firms (or more precisely, be exempt from taxes like 
nonprofit firms) when they engage in charitable activities?”185  
They conclude that there is no rational reason to grant tax 
breaks solely based upon organizational form, and therefore say 
“yes” to the question in the previous sentence.186 
While Professors Malani and Posner focus primarily on the 
deductibility of donations when they discuss tax breaks for 
charitable purposes,187 and this Article is concerned more with 
the exemption from income taxation, it remains relevant that 
they affirm the convergence of the nonprofit and for-profit forms 
and agree that tax benefits solely based upon a firm’s consent not 
to distribute its profits are irrational.188  Whereas their 
?
182 See Susannah Camic Tahk, Crossing the Tax Code’s For-Profit/Nonprofit 
Border, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 489, 489 (2014). 
183 Id. at 490. 
184 Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charities, 93 VA. L. 
REV. 2017, 2022–23 (2007). 
185 Id. at 2023. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. at 2025–27. 
188 It should be noted that Malani and Posner’s suggestion has—perhaps not 
surprisingly, given its somewhat radical nature—been criticized by several 
commentators who argue that the coupling of tax breaks with the nonprofit form 
serve important, and defensible, functions and can be justified under various 
theories, including the theory of agency. See, e.g., Brian Galle, Keep Charity 
Charitable, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1213, 1213 (2010); Benjamin Moses Leff, The Case 
Against For-Profit Charity, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 819, 839 (2012). 
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suggestion is to provide more tax breaks to for-profit entities,189 
this Article takes the opposite tack and suggests fewer subsidies 
for nonprofits. 
IV. THE PROPOSED SOLUTION 
A. A Framework for Evaluating Any Proposed Change to the 
Tax Code 
In order to craft an effective solution to the problem outlined 
in Part III, several criteria must be met.  First, the solution must 
be narrowly tailored to address the issue.  Implementing a 
change in the tax code that negatively affects those nonprofits 
that do not accumulate massive endowments or regular large 
annual profits is unacceptable. 
Second, the solution should respect the autonomy of all 
organizations.  Legislating strategy decisions best made by 
managers and directors are typically a bad idea.  If an 
organization feels it is necessary to build a large  
endowment—whether it is to save for a rainy day or simply to 
gain prestige—the government should not intrude upon such 
decisions.  True, Congress should have a say in how tax dollars 
are spent, but to the extent possible, it should also steer clear of 
involving itself in the operational matters of private 
organizations. 
Third, any proposal must be inexpensive to implement and 
maintain.  If the IRS spends more administering new rules 
pertaining to exempt organizations than it might receive in 
revenue from those same rules, the effort is pointless.  Finally, 
and most importantly, any solution to the problem of tax-exempt 
money not being used for tax-exempt purposes must actually 
address the problem.  If the end result is not that tax dollars are 
being used in the manner expected by society, any such solution 
is unsatisfactory. 
To these ends, the following recommendation seems like it 
would be the most effective means by which nonprofits could be 
held accountable for the subsidies they receive. 
?
189 Malani & Posner, supra note 184, at 2065. 
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B. A Proposal for Reforming Nonprofit Income Taxation 
This proposal is to remove the income tax exemption for 
nonprofits but to allow them an unlimited deduction for expenses 
directly related to their charitable purposes,190 coupled with a 
reasonable standard deduction,191 allowances for carrying losses 
forward, and a five-year capital savings exemption.192  The 
following paragraphs explain this suggestion in detail. 
First, by removing the income tax exemption but permitting 
nonprofits to deduct all expenses actually related to their 
charitable purposes, those nonprofits that actually spend 
virtually all of their revenue193 on fulfilling their nonprofit 
mission will be largely unaffected.  Only those nonprofits that 
generate significant profits will incur a measure of income tax 
liability.  Recognizing that it is impossible for a firm to operate 
?
190 It seems reasonable that this deduction would match the business expense 
deduction provided to for-profit corporations in § 162, which provides a deduction for 
“all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in 
carrying on any trade or business.” I.R.C § 162(a) (West 2014). All that would be 
required is the removal of “trade or business” and the insertion of appropriate 
language pertaining to nonprofit operations. Section 162 and the various cases and 
regulations interpreting it have already developed a very thorough framework for 
determining what expenses qualify for the deduction, and the very same analysis 
could be applied to deductions for nonprofit business expenses. 
191 It seems reasonable that this standard deduction would be somewhere 
around ten million dollars, but more in-depth economic analysis would be required 
to pinpoint an optimal figure. 
192 The question could be raised as to why this recommendation is not instead 
structured as an excise tax on retained earnings above a certain amount. Such a 
structure would indeed function identically to the suggestion put forth herein and 
would avoid the political pitfalls associated with news headlines touting taking away 
the tax exemption for charities. However, for two reasons, the recommended 
structure is preferred. First, it treats nonprofits more like the business entities that 
they are. Modern, sophisticated nonprofits function just like their for-profit 
counterparts, and changing the tax code to reflect the way they actually treat 
revenue and expenses will bring it more in line with actual current practices. 
Second, this author believes that for-profit organizations should also be granted a 
deduction for expenditures made for charitable purposes—not just a § 170 deduction 
for donations, but actual § 162 business expense deductions for charitable activities. 
This is the topic for a follow-up article, but by implementing this Article’s 
recommendations in the structure presented here, it would be a much smaller step 
to permit for-profit institutions to be able to deduct expenses related to their 
charitable activities. 
193 Here, revenue is generally defined as all incoming cash flows. For taxpaying 
entities, revenue is categorized into income, capital gains, and more. For purposes of 
this Article, all incoming funds will simply be lumped into one category. It may be 
beneficial at a later date to make distinctions between, say, revenue from donations 
and revenue from interest on endowment assets, but it is unnecessary at this point. 
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with expenses precisely matched to revenues, a properly 
determined standard deduction, which is added to the top of an 
organization’s total business expense deductions, will permit 
most nonprofits to book a small amount of profit without the fear 
of incurring income tax liability and to offset losses in one year 
against profits in future years.  However, when profits reach into 
the eight-, nine-, or ten-figure range, the organization would be 
forced to pay tax on its profits. 
The theory behind this part of the proposal is that, when a 
nonprofit earns some small amount of profit that is reasonable 
and to be expected for an entity that wishes to maintain financial 
viability into the future, it is not exploiting the exemption.  
However, when an exempt organization books many millions, or 
even billions, of dollars in profit, it would seem that such a firm 
is potentially exploiting the exemption.  As Hansmann would put 
it, such a firm is overcapitalized and not in need of an 
exemption,194 so why give it one? 
The other prong of this proposal is to allow nonprofits to 
raise capital for a specific purpose over a five-year period without 
incurring income tax liability.  In times of growth, organizations 
frequently raise funds over a period of time longer than one year 
for a major capital project, such as a new building or major 
equipment purchase.  It would be unfair to preclude nonprofits 
from continuing to raise funds for such purposes, so by 
permitting them to designate a specific capital project for which 
they may set apart profits into a separate account—for a 
maximum period of five years—firms will be able to continue to 
make large capital investments as always.  If the funds are spent 
on the capital project as designated, then there is no tax liability.  
If the capital project gets scrapped or there are excess funds in 
the account upon completion, then those funds would be subject 
to income taxation, although the loss carryforward deductions 
would still be available. 
Allow us to consider two examples of how this proposal 
would play out in real-world situations.  First, consider a small 
poverty relief charity with a budget of one million dollars 
annually.  When the economy is booming, this nonprofit might 
receive a flood of donations, giving it a net profit in such years.  
On the contrary, during difficult economic times, when the need 
?
194 See Hansmann, supra note 7, at 75. 
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is greater, its expenses might exceed its revenues and the 
organization will book a loss in those years.  On average, 
however, while this nonprofit has some money in the bank for a 
rainy day, it does not have a large endowment earning interest 
from which it can draw. 
For small organizations such as this one, nothing will 
change.  Because the profits it makes in good years are small, 
they will fall within the standard deduction and no tax will be 
due.  If the organization wishes to raise funds for a new 
building—say, for instance, a homeless shelter—it need only 
designate the specific capital project on its annual filing with the 
Interal Revenue Service (“IRS”) and place the funds into a 
separate account.  As long as they are used for that purpose 
within five years, those funds are also tax-free, even if they 
exceed the standard deduction.  This organization was already 
filing a Form 990 each year with the IRS, which listed various 
key components of its charitable activities and financial 
performance.195  It will continue to file the same information with 
the IRS—although perhaps on a different form—and nothing else 
will really change for this small charity.  If the firm is ever 
audited, it must be able to justify that the expenses it has 
deducted are indeed in furtherance of its charitable mission, so 
receipts must be kept and careful records maintained.  Any 
nonprofit of similar size is almost certainly already following 
such practices. 
Now consider a large nonprofit metropolitan hospital.  This 
hospital receives revenues in excess of one billion dollars each 
year and maintains a sizable endowment.  Annual profits 
typically range between $50 million and $100 million,196 most of 
which gets added to the endowment.  To maintain its nonprofit 
status, the hospital does use a small percentage of its annual 
?
195 Nonprofits with annual receipts in excess of $500,000 are required to file 
Forms 990 annually. Smaller firms may file Forms 990-EZ or 990-N, but all firms, 
except those with less than $50,000 in gross receipts, are required to submit 
documentation of their financial status each year. See Which Forms Do Exempt 
Organizations File?, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-
Non-Profits/Form-990-Series-Which-Forms-Do-Exempt-Organizations-File-Filing-
Phase-In (last updated Feb. 8, 2016). 
196 This translates into a five- to ten-percent profit margin, which is fairly 
typical for a hospital. See Aggregate Total Hospital Margins, Operating Margins, 
and Patient Margins, 1992–2012, AM. HOSP. ASS’N, http://www.aha.org/ 
research/reports/tw/chartbook/2014/chart4-2.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2016). 
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profits on charity assistance for patients who are unable to pay 
their bills.  Because the hospital is not using its profits for any 
charitable purpose in a timely manner, those profits in excess of 
the standard deduction will be subject to income taxation.197  The 
hospital is free to add to its endowment as it sees fit, but those 
funds that will simply sit unused for many years will be taxed 
prior to being added to the endowment.  If it decided to use more 
money on patient care instead of endowment padding, those 
expenses would all be 100% deductible and would reduce the 
organization’s tax liability. 
If the hospital were to book a loss in a given year, it could 
apply that loss to reduce its tax liability in future years.  Also, if 
it decided to undertake a large capital expansion—such as a new 
wing or research center—it could do so in the exact same manner 
as the small charity previously described.  Likewise, the hospital 
would continue to file all of its relevant financial information 
with the IRS in the same manner as before. 
For nonprofits large and small, this proposal would 
incentivize them to spend their revenues advancing their 
nonprofit mission, instead of building their savings accounts 
without limit, although it would still permit endowment 
buildup—albeit with a cut going back to the taxpayers 
subsidizing the gains—if that is the desired strategy of the firm’s 
managers.  Likewise, it would also allow for annual fluctuations 
between small profits and losses without penalty. 
This proposal seems to have certain benefits, but how does it 
stack up against the criteria previously set forth for any proposed 
changes to the tax code affecting nonprofits? 
C. Evaluating the Proposal Against the Framework 
So how does this proposal stack up against the framework 
set forth in Part V.A?  The first criterion is that any changes 
must be narrowly tailored to specifically address the problem of 
nonprofits that abuse the exemption without negatively affecting 
those nonprofits that typically spend substantially all of their 
?
197 The issue of the proper rate for the tax on such profits is beyond the scope of 
the discussion here. Reasonable arguments can be made for matching the rate to the 
rate paid by corporations on their income since nonprofits are typically organized 
and operated as corporations, albeit under the separate not-for-profit corporation act 
of each state. Arguments could also be made in favor of a lesser tax rate to serve as 
some measure of recognition of the history of preferred tax treatment of nonprofits. 
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revenues on their charitable missions.  As the two examples in 
the previous Subsection demonstrate, the small nonprofit that 
uses all, or almost all, of its revenue for its purpose of poverty 
relief will notice virtually no change whatsoever.  This is true 
even if the small charity earns a profit or engages in a capital 
campaign.  It is not until a nonprofit grows large enough, and 
realizes significant enough profits, that it will be affected by this 
proposal at all, and then it is only affected only to the extent that 
it fails to use those profits to advance its charitable purposes.  
Thus, the first criterion seems to be satisfied. 
The second metric is that any change should respect the 
autonomy of organizations.  It has of course been suggested that 
certain charities be forced to pay out a set percentage of their 
endowments each year,198 as is the case for private foundations,199 
but this seems excessively intrusive.  If an organization receives 
revenue, it should have discretion to use the revenue as it sees fit 
and to the greatest extent possible.  Thus, under the proposal at 
issue, nonprofit organizations are free to build sizable 
endowments; they just cannot do so with tax-free money.  If they 
just want to save some money, they can do so to their hearts’ 
content, but taxpayers should not be subsidizing billion-dollar 
endowments that are untouchable; such firms must simply pay 
tax on the profits that go into the endowment.  Once there, the 
firm is free to manage the investments as it sees fit. 
As a third condition, any proposed change must be 
inexpensive to implement and administer.  Under the proposal 
outlined in this Article, the amount of work required by both the 
IRS and nonprofit organizations will change minimally.  The IRS 
already has mechanisms in place for evaluating revenue and 
expenses, thanks to those statutes pertaining to corporate 
taxation,200 which could very easily be adapted for the nonprofit 
sector.  For instance, § 162 provides a thorough system for 
determining what expenditures are deductible as business 
expenses for for-profit firms, and the same system could be easily 
adapted to expenses allowed as deductions for nonprofits.201  
Therefore, this condition is easily satisfied. 
?
198 See, e.g., Cowan, supra note 171 (assessing arguments for mandatory 
minimum payouts for college endowments, but ultimately arguing against them). 
199 I.R.C. § 4942 (West 2014). 
200 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 61 (2012); I.R.C. § 162 (West 2014). 
201 See I.R.C. § 162. 
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Finally, does this solution solve the problem?  We are 
concerned about tax-exempt organizations failing to use their 
publicly subsidized funds for charitable purposes, so does this 
proposal rectify those concerns?  In a narrow sense, it does.  You 
either spend your revenues on your charitable purpose or you pay 
a tax.  Nonprofits certainly seem like they would be incentivized 
to devote more of their profits to expanding their benefit to 
society.  If they choose instead to save those profits, then they 
can pay a tax on the money they put into savings—which is 
essentially the equivalent of returning the subsidy given to them 
by the government.  However, there is also the possibility that 
organizations will seek to curb their potential tax liability not by 
advancing their charitable purposes, but by other means.  Part 
VI, below, addresses some of the challenges to this proposal. 
D. So What Value Remains in Nonprofit Status? 
Without an exemption from income taxation, one may 
wonder why an organization would choose the nonprofit form 
anymore.  There are multiple reasons, the most important of 
which is the § 170 deduction for donations.202  The 
recommendation to eliminate the income tax exemption does not 
carry over to the deduction for donations to nonprofits.  The 
deductibility of donations is a powerful incentive for individuals 
to support charitable programs, and without it, nonprofits of all 
types would see massive declines in their revenues. 
When private people give money to a nonprofit, they 
reasonably expect that those funds will be used in furtherance of 
the organization’s charitable purposes, so we allow the donors to 
deduct the amount of their donation from their taxable income.  
If the nonprofit chooses not to use the funds for that purpose and 
instead simply adds to its endowment, the donors should not be 
punished.  The nonprofit should pay a tax on such funds, but the 
donors’ deductions will remain in place. 
Even without the deduction for donations, the nonprofit form 
is an indicator that an organization is committed to its charitable 
purposes and worthy of public support.203  Without the 
nondistribution constraint, the theory is that the public will view 
?
202 Id. § 170. 
203 Henry Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 
497, 504–09 (1981). 
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the organization’s management as less likely to be committed to 
societal benefit and more likely to be seeking a return for its 
shareholders and will therefore provide less financial support.204 
Additionally, as previously mentioned, for the vast majority 
of charities that do not sock away megaprofits each year, 
virtually nothing would change.205  Obtaining recognition by the 
IRS as a 501(c)(3) 206 corporation would still grant the corporation 
essentially the same benefits it already enjoys under the current 
law. 
Finally, this Article does not address several additional 
benefits of the nonprofit form, but they are also key factors when 
choosing an entity type.  The most prominent of these are the 
various forms of tax exemption beyond the income tax exemption 
that nonprofits enjoy.  For example, most charitable 
organizations receive a property tax exemption and sales tax 
exemptions.207  As this Article’s purpose is to address reforms 
needed at the federal level, and property and sales taxes are 
state-level matters, such issues are beyond the scope of this 
discussion.208  Nevertheless, such benefits are incredibly powerful 
motivators for those choosing the nonprofit form. 
 
 
 
 
?
204 Id. 
205 See supra Part IV.B. 
206 See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 
207 See N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 420-a (McKinney 2013); N.Y. TAX 
LAW § 1116 (McKinney 2008). 
208 An argument can be made that the state-level tax exemptions are actually 
more valuable to the average nonprofit than the federal exemption. The property tax 
exemption appears to be especially important. Consider, for example, a church that 
owns a large building, where it holds services. The building may have an assessed 
value well into the millions, which would result in significant tax liability for the 
church regardless of how much revenue it brought in. However, with the property 
tax exemption, the church need only worry about bringing in enough revenue to 
cover its operating expenses, which are generally proportional to the size of its 
congregation. While the value of the income tax exemption is proportional to the 
profits of the organization, the property tax exemption is proportional to its assets, 
thereby allowing a nonprofit to enjoy small revenues but hold large assets. 
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E. Convergence with Other Theories of Exemption 
Even though this Article’s recommendation is to eliminate 
the blanket income tax exemption for nonprofits, such a proposal 
is not necessarily at odds with the various theories justifying the 
exemption discussed previously.209  In fact, the thrust of each of 
these theories converges nicely with this Article’s proposals. 
The key concept in the Public Good Theory is that society 
wants to create an incentive for private organizations to provide 
goods and services so that the government will not have to do 
so.210  Under the scheme suggested herein, the same goals would 
be satisfied and likely to an even greater extent than under the 
current system.  Today, nonprofits are subsidized by tax dollars 
merely for existing, even if they never spend their revenues on 
charitable activities.  By removing the exemption and allowing 
deductions for money actually spent in furtherance of a firm’s 
nonprofit purposes, the incentive to actually create public good 
will be magnified.  Likewise, by taxing money received by a 
nonprofit and not put to good use, the public will be reimbursed 
for unused subsidies.  Thus, the goal of the Public Good Theory 
will be more fully realized. 
Likewise, the underlying goals of Hansmann’s Capital 
Formation Theory211 will be better served by this Article’s 
recommendations than by the current system.  If the reason for 
granting the exemption was to give nonprofits a means of 
acquiring sufficient capital—since they are unable to avail 
themselves of equity capital like for-profit firms212—then any 
changes to the current system must still allow undercapitalized 
nonprofits to receive, and even accumulate, revenue without 
being subject to income taxation.  Under the proposal at hand, 
nonprofits may retain a certain amount of profits—up to the 
standard deduction limit—tax-free and may also set aside funds 
for a specific capital expense for a period of up to five years, also 
tax-free.213  However, whereas the current tax code provides an 
income tax exemption to all qualifying nonprofits, regardless of 
need, this Article’s proposal would limit the public subsidy to 
only those firms that are truly undercapitalized.  Overcapitalized 
?
209 See supra Part I.C. 
210 Id. 
211 See Hansmann, supra note 7, at 55. 
212 Id. at 63. 
213 See supra Part IV.B. 
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firms, like many nonprofit hospitals, which realize many millions 
of dollars in annual profits, would not be given public subsidies to 
pad their bank accounts.  Hansmann himself acknowledged the 
risk of subsidizing overcapitalized firms but did not see it as 
being as much of a problem as it has become in the thirty years 
since he addressed the issue.214 
When discussing the Donative Theory of exemption for 
nonprofits, this Article noted that it seems to work very well for 
those organizations that are supported largely by public 
donations, but perhaps not as well for more commercial 
nonprofits, like many hospitals, or for nonprofits that have a mix 
of revenues from donations and commercial activities.215  Under 
the Donative Theory, charities supported by private donations 
should be tax exempt because they provide goods or services not 
adequately provided by either the government or the 
marketplace.216  Under the proposal at hand, such entities would 
continue to be free from income taxation to the extent they 
actually provide such goods or services.  To the extent they keep 
the money donated to them without putting it to charitable use, 
they would incur income tax liability. 
The same rationale applies to a discussion of this Article’s 
proposal in the context of Atkinson’s altruism theory.217  If we 
truly desire to provide tax incentives for organizations that act 
altruistically, should we not provide those tax breaks only when 
they are actually acting out of a spirit of altruism?  Limitless 
accumulation of endowment wealth does not seem to be 
particularly altruistic. 
Likewise, Crimm’s theory of compensating nonprofits for 
assuming the risk of producing public goods218 should only apply 
to organizations to the extent that they are producing public 
goods.  Firms that accumulate large retained earnings would not 
seem to be in need of compensation for assuming risk. 
?
214 See Hansmann, supra note 7, at 75. 
215 See supra Part I.C.4. In fact, the Donative Theory would likely argue against 
exempting most commercial nonprofits that are not supported by donations. See Hall 
& Colombo, supra note 49, at 409–10. 
216 See supra Part I.C.4. 
217 See supra Part I.C.5. 
218 See supra Part I.C.5. 
FINAL_FRICKE 6/28/2016  2:36 PM 
1176 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:1129   
F. What of the UBIT? 
With the income tax exemption repealed, will the unrelated 
business income tax (“UBIT”) automatically be done away with 
as well?  Not necessarily.  The UBIT was originally created in an 
effort to keep commercial nonprofits from using the advantage of 
taxpayer subsidies to drive for-profit firms out of business.219  If 
this purpose is still a valid concern, then the UBIT could easily 
remain in place, and nonprofits would pay tax on the income 
derived from activities unrelated to their charitable mission in 
the same manner they currently do.  However, it may be the case 
that the risk of nonprofits dominating the private sector is 
perhaps not as severe as Congress thought it was in 1950, mainly 
due to some of the disadvantages such organizations face, which 
could negate the advantage of tax exemption.220 
Whether the UBIT lives or dies is inconsequential to the 
proposal made in this Article.  The future of the UBIT is, 
however, a ripe topic for further study especially given the fact 
that recent scholarship has tended to blur the lines between the 
nonprofit and for-profit sectors.221 
V. CHALLENGES TO THE PROPOSED SOLUTION 
To be sure, any suggestion that involves ending a system 
that has been in place for well over a century is not without its 
challenges.  This Part discusses some of the possible objections to 
this Article’s proposal, beginning with perhaps the most obvious 
issue of the difficulty in gaining political traction for such an 
idea. 
?
219 See Strefeler & Miller, supra note 29. 
220 The prime example of one such disadvantage is the lack of ability to attract 
equity capital. Thus, while nonprofits have the advantage of not having to pay taxes, 
they lose the ability to attract investors since they are unable to provide them with a 
return on their investment. Then the question becomes, which is more valuable: the 
tax exemption or the ability to attract equity capital? It is difficult to say, but it 
seems that these two factors likely balance each other out, leaving nonprofits and 
for-profits on a relatively even playing field. See, e.g., Hansmann, supra note 7, at 
72. 
221 See, e.g., Brody, supra note 178 (analyzing whether there is a difference 
between for-profit and nonprofit sectors); Malani & Posner, supra note 184, at 2023 
(finding that for-profits should be exempt from taxes like nonprofit firms). 
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A. Is the Proposal Even Possible, Given the Entrenched Nature 
of the Income Tax Exemption for Nonprofits? 
Undoubtedly, constituents of a group that has enjoyed a 
benefit for over 100 years will be highly resistant to any change 
in that benefit that could be construed as a lessening of the 
subsidy provided to them.  While it is true that the plan proposed 
herein will not affect the amount of subsidy provided to the vast 
majority of nonprofits, those organizations that will be most 
affected are also the firms with the deepest pockets, and deep 
pockets mean more lobbying power and ability to resist change. 
While the giant nonprofits hospitals and Ivy League 
universities of the world will surely oppose such changes to the 
taxation of nonprofits, there is in fact precedent for narrowing 
the scope of the income tax exemption, which can serve as a 
model for implementation of the current plan. 
To begin with, this Subsection considers the unrelated 
business income tax.  The UBIT was not enacted until 1950, in 
response to a perceived problem of nonprofits utilizing their tax-
exempt status in order to compete unfairly with their for-profit 
counterparts.222  By 1950, the permanent income tax had been in 
place for thirty-seven years,223 and charitable organizations had 
never paid taxes on any of their income, regardless of its 
source,224 dating as far back as the Tariff Act of 1894, fifty-six 
years prior to the enactment of the UBIT.225  Thus, the enactment 
of the UBIT in 1950 was not without some measure of 
controversy.  Shortly after its passage, Professor Maurice 
Finkelstein noted: 
[T]he Revenue Act of 1950 has put obstacles—some of which are 
insurmountable—in the path of the taking over of industry by 
tax exempt associations. . . . But it is saddening to note that 
both the creation of the tax exemptions and their partial repeal 
have been accomplished without consideration of the basic 
elements of public policy involved.226 
?
222 See Strefeler & Miller, supra note 29. 
223 See Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 172, amended by Revenue Act 
of 1916, ch. 463, 39 Stat. 756, 777. 
224 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 46, at 100. 
225 Revenue Act of 1894, ch. 349, 28 Stat. 509, 570, invalidated by Pollock v. 
Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 637 (1895). 
226 Maurice Finkelstein, Tax Exempt Charitable Corporations: Revenue Act of 
1950, 50 MICH. L. REV. 427, 428 (1952). 
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This Article’s proposal is analogous to the passage of the 
UBIT.  The percentage of the total number of exempt entities 
drastically affected by the passage of the UBIT was small, as will 
be the percentage of nonprofit firms materially affected by the 
proposal set forth herein.227  Today, the UBIT’s “partial repeal”228 
of the income tax exemption is viewed as fairly noncontroversial, 
and it has stood the test of time for more than sixty years.  Who 
is to say that a further modification of the treatment of 
nonprofits cannot be similarly successful, especially when it does 
in fact take into account “the basic elements of public policy 
involved,” as Professor Finkelstein put it?229 
In addition to the UBIT, one can look to the statutes 
affecting private foundations for an example of a tax imposed on 
nonprofit organizations.  A private foundation is a 501(c)(3) 
nonprofit organization that does not itself carry on any charitable 
activities but rather receives funds from a limited number of 
donors—frequently a single wealthy individual—and then 
invests or distributes those funds to other 501(c)(3) 
organizations.230  Section 4942 of the tax code requires private 
foundations to distribute at least five percent of their total assets 
each year.231  If the foundation fails to distribute at least five 
percent of its assets every year, the difference between the 
amount it actually distributes and five percent must be paid as a 
tax.232  Thus, if a private foundation only distributed two percent 
of its total assets in a given year, it would be required to pay a 
tax in the amount of three percent of its total assets. 
Further, private foundations are subject to a two percent tax 
on their net investment income each year, regardless of the 
manner in which they use such income.233  Private foundations 
are by definition nonprofits that fall under § 501(c)(3), and yet 
they are subject to multiple taxes on their income.234  Much like 
the UBIT, the taxes imposed on private foundations were enacted 
by Congress for specific reasons, even though at least one  
 
?
227 Strefeler & Miller, supra note 29, at n.191. 
228 Finkelstein, supra note 226. 
229 Id. 
230 I.R.C. § 509 (2012). 
231 I.R.C. § 4942 (West 2014). 
232 Id. 
233 I.R.C. § 4940 (2012). 
234 Id. 
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legislator decried such moves as “a beginning in the removal of 
income tax exemption” for all nonprofits.235  In fact, the concept of 
a private foundation did not even exist prior to 1969.236 
The excise tax on the net investment income for private 
foundations237 was originally intended to defray the IRS’s 
expenses in conducting audits of nonprofit organizations—never 
mind the fact that the IRS had not been thusly compensated 
prior to 1969 even though nonprofits had been exempt from 
income taxation since the income tax was made permanent in 
1913.238  However, the revenue from the excise tax has not 
traditionally been specifically allocated to IRS audit functions 
and in fact far exceeds the costs of such audits.239 
Likewise, the tax on undistributed assets arose because 
wealthy individuals were creating private nonprofits into which 
they were transferring significant assets—and thereby taking tax 
deductions on their personal income taxes—but never using the 
money in the foundations for charitable purposes.240  The concept 
of a nonprofit receiving large amounts of revenue and not putting 
the money towards its charitable purposes should sound familiar, 
as it is essentially the same problem addressed throughout this 
Article.  If Congress could act to combat a similar problem in the 
context of private foundations, why should it be unable to do the 
same when faced with an analogous situation?  Today, more than 
fifty years after their enactment, neither the excise tax on 
investment income nor the tax on undistributed income are 
particularly controversial. 
If the UBIT and the taxes on private foundations can 
succeed, despite the long history of complete tax exemption for 
nonprofits, then it stands to reason that an additional 
modification, which only affects those large nonprofits that use 
their profits primarily to grow their endowments, would not be 
outside the realm of possibility. 
 
?
235 S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 27 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, 2054. 
236 I.R.C. § 509 (2012). 
237 Id. § 4940. 
238 S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 6. 
239 Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 49, at 326 n.68. 
240 Trevor Findley, Comment, Tax Treatment of Private Charitable Foundations: 
A Call To Simplify the Excise Tax, 49 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 477, 479–81 (2012). 
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B. Would the Proposal Encourage Wasteful Spending To Avoid 
Taxation? 
Twenty-five years ago, Professor Hansmann considered the 
issue of endowment accumulation by universities and concluded 
that “efforts to limit endowment accumulation might in part have 
the effect of diverting universities toward other, less efficient 
forms of accumulation (for example, useless facilities or excessive 
esoteric research by faculty) or toward unproductive current 
spending.”241  This risk seems to apply equally to all categories of 
nonprofits should measures be enacted that entail negative 
consequences for the unchecked accumulation of endowments, as 
the proposal described in this Article does. 
No one enjoys paying taxes; that much is clear.  Most 
businesses and individuals go to great lengths to reduce their tax 
liability to the maximum extent allowed under the law.  Thus, it 
stands to reason that a nonprofit, when facing a choice between 
paying some tax or spending money on a capital improvement, as 
an example—even if it does not need the improvement at that 
time—would quite likely choose to spend the money rather than 
pay the tax.  One can envision a world filled with empty hospital 
wings, rooms full of brand new, unused scientific equipment, and 
universities with more professors than they know what to do 
with—which might not be such a bad thing! 
It is conceded that the threat of an income tax on unused 
profits is likely to cause at least some measure of wasteful 
spending among some nonprofit organizations.  The question 
then arises, which is worse: taxpayer subsidies for unnecessary 
expenditures or taxpayer subsidies for endowment accumulation?  
In an ideal world, all nonprofits would find useful, needed means 
of spending substantially all of their revenues, but for those that 
do not, this is essentially the choice. 
Of course, the most useful option might be to just pay the tax 
and return the funds to the public, since they clearly are not 
needed.  While that might be a consideration for a slice of 
particularly socially conscious nonprofits, it seems like it would 
be the exception, rather than the norm. 
 
?
241 Henry Hansmann, Why Do Universities Have Endowments?, 19 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 3, 40 (1990). 
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It does seem, however, that nonprofit organizations would 
still perhaps shy away from making unnecessary expenditures 
simply to avoid tax liability for two reasons.  First, there is not a 
dollar-for-dollar equivalency when measuring paying the tax 
versus unproductive spending.  Even using a high tax rate of 
thirty-five percent,242 if a nonprofit earned $100 million in 
taxable income during a given year, it would still be able to add 
sixty-five million dollars of that income to its endowment, if it so 
chose.  However, to avoid all tax liability, the organization would 
have to spend the entire $100 million.  Thus, the unnecessary 
spending would need to add at least sixty-five million dollars in 
value to the organization or the nonprofit would be better off 
simply paying the tax. 
The second reason is that nonprofit organizations do not 
exist in a vacuum.  They are accountable to a host of different 
constituencies and must make decisions based on a variety of 
factors.  If a university gained a reputation for wasteful spending 
in order to avoid tax liability, that school would likely face a 
backlash from its donor base.  While a certain measure of 
increased spending would likely happen without repercussion—
which would likely be a good thing, as we have already 
established that nonprofits can be overly stingy about protecting 
endowments instead of spending them—such extreme tax 
avoidance schemes would likely be kept in check by the need of 
an organization to keep its core stakeholders happy. 
Thus, while it is certainly possible that highly profitable 
nonprofits will adjust their budgets to minimize their tax 
liability, and perhaps even engage in wasteful spending, there 
are several powerful controls to keep such spending in check.  An 
increase in total spending is desirable, as some large nonprofits 
have likely underspent under the current tax system, so the risk 
of wasteful spending, while present, does not appear to be overly 
significant. 
?
242 Thirty-five percent is the federal rate paid by corporations on income above 
ten million dollars. I.R.C. § 11 (2012). This Article is not advocating that nonprofit 
incomes be subject to the corporate rate, but rather uses it as an example of one of 
the highest rates paid by any entity in the United States as of this writing. In 
reality, this author believes a rate more in line with the capital gains rate—
generally fifteen percent or twenty percent, depending on various factors—would be 
more suitable for the proposal in this Article. 
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C. Other Objections 
Several other objections to this Article’s proposal are 
discussed in this Subsection, beginning with the risk that large 
nonprofits could attempt to beat the system by breaking into 
multiple, smaller organizations to shield large amounts of total 
profit by making it appear to be smaller profits divided across 
many entities.  For example, a hospital might attempt to spin off 
each of its individual departments into standalone entities for 
the purpose of allowing each department to max out the standard 
deduction, thereby permitting the departments in aggregate to 
accumulate profits far above what the hospital could have as a 
single operating entity. 
This risk, and other similar attempts to “game the system,” 
are inherent in any tax system and can be combatted through 
regulatory action.  For example, in the scenario described above, 
the Treasury Department could very easily propose regulations 
that require affiliated entities to file a group income tax return or 
require separate charitable funds that support the same 
operating organization to disclose such support and thereby tax 
the conglomerate instead of each individual entity.  For as long 
as tax liability exists, taxpayers will find creative ways to 
minimize their payments, and the IRS will continue to pass 
regulations in an attempt to curtail such action.  It is the way of 
the world, and no different should nonprofits find themselves the 
subject of taxation. 
Another challenge might come from organizations that rely 
upon endowed gifts to support specific programs, such as an 
endowed chair at a university.  Would this Article’s plan hinder 
the future of endowed programs by limiting the buildup of an 
organization’s endowment?  Undoubtedly, major donors might 
think twice if they knew that the beneficiary institution might 
have to use a portion of an endowed gift to pay income taxes.243  
However, due to the fungible nature of money, this would likely 
seldom, if ever, become an issue.  A dollar is a dollar, regardless 
of the source, so nonprofit firms could honestly pledge to their 
donors that 100% of an endowed gift would be used for charitable 
?
243 However, note that under this Article’s proposal, the donors would still 
receive the full deduction. Thus, the analysis likely hinges on the degree of altruism 
of each donor. A cynic might argue that the donors would likely still make the full 
donation since the donors continue to receive the full benefit. 
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purposes—and not to pay income taxes—because any tax liability 
the organization might incur could always be paid out of other 
revenue streams. 
The only instance in which this seems like it could become 
an issue would be in the event of a major donation in the range of 
$100 million or more.  To add such an amount to an 
organization’s endowment would surely give rise to some tax 
liability, and depending on the size of the firm, revenues from 
other sources might not be sufficient to pay the entire amount of 
the tax.  In such case, it is possible that the nonprofit would be 
forced to use part of the endowed gift to pay income taxes.  
However, depending on the nature of the donation, the nonprofit 
could also take advantage of the five-year capital investment 
benefit and save the funds for a specific purpose. 
Finally, there is the question of whether an organization will 
be able to undertake a long-term capital expansion project.  
While unlikely, it is possible that a nonprofit could engage in a 
capital campaign, the results of which would not be realized for 
more than five years.  In such a case, the Treasury Department 
could always propose regulations permitting a nonprofit to 
petition for an extension of the five-year period, upon good cause 
shown. 
Like any system of taxation that pertains to a broad scope of 
organizations, there will always be challenges that arise and 
certain groups that may feel like they are being disadvantaged.  
Although no tax plan is perfect, the one outlined in this Article 
treats organizations fairly and respects the rights of the 
taxpayer—and the subsidies provided by taxpayers—to a greater 
extent than the framework under which we currently operate. 
CONCLUSION 
Income tax exemption for nonprofit organizations is 
something that we all take for granted.  Many of us have visions 
of nonprofits out there improving society, and while that may be 
quite true for most nonprofits, the income tax exemption is the 
equivalent of giving tax money directly to such organizations, 
simply because they are formed for a certain purpose, regardless 
of whether the funds are used for such purpose in a timely 
manner.  While many nonprofits do struggle with lack of funds 
and dire needs, there exists a group of tax-exempt entities for  
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which profits regularly flow quite freely, often to the tune of more 
than $100 million, or even $1 billion or more.  And yet, the public 
subsidizes each nonprofit in exactly the same manner. 
This Article outlined a potential change in the tax code 
regarding nonprofits that would enable undercapitalized firms to 
continue receiving the exact same subsidy as before, but would 
create a tax liability for those large nonprofits that generate 
substantial—ten million dollars or more—profits and fail to 
spend those profits in pursuit of their charitable mission.  By 
removing the blanket income tax exemption and allowing an 
unlimited deduction for expenditures made in furtherance of 
charitable purposes, those nonprofits that use their revenues to 
benefit society would continue to avoid all taxation, but those 
that simply build their endowments without ever using such 
funds would not be able to benefit from a taxpayer subsidy for 
those funds. 
 
